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I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of constitutionally entrenched rights originated in the United
States, and its spread throughout the world in the latter half of the
twentieth century—both at national and supranational levels—is a
reflection of the perceived success of American constitutionalism. But
while constitutional rights and judicial review have proven popular, the
American vehicle for rights protection has not. The U.S. Bill of Rights
looks old and deficient compared to modern bills of rights. Its negative
orientation—the idea that rights are state-limiting concepts1—is widely
regarded as either inadequate or downright harmful given more benign
conceptions of the state, larger public sectors, and more extensive
welfare-state policies, not to mention greater antipathy towards the
exercise of private economic power. Increasingly, rights are seen not
simply as important individual interests that must be immunized against
state interference, but as entitlements that the state must fulfill, not only
for individuals but for groups. The focus of the U.S. Bill of Rights on
the civil and political rights of individuals is presumed to come at the
expense of group economic and social rights,2 environmental rights, and
so on—so-called second and third generation rights.
As a result, international bills of rights like the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),3 regional bills of rights like the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),4 and domestic bills of
rights like the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms5 and the South
1. For an American critique of the idea of positive rights see Frank B. Cross, The
Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857 (2001).
2. Keith Ewing’s work is typical here. See, e.g., K.D. Ewing, The Unbalanced
Constitution, in SCEPTICAL ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 103 (Tom Campbell, K.D. Ewing
& Adam Tomkins eds., 2001).
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (in force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
4. European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (in
force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR].
5. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982,
ch. 11 (U.K.) [hereinafter Canadian Charter].
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African Bill of Rights,6 tend to be lengthier and more specific than the
U.S. Bill of Rights. They may run to several pages, setting out various
rights in detail complete with numerous subsections. Rights that the
U.S. Supreme Court has inferred from the text of the U.S. Bill of Rights
are likely to be enumerated in these newer bills of rights,7 along with
additional rights—both negative and positive in their orientation—that
have no American counterpart.8
A further difference is that individual rights are not regarded (or at
least presented) as unalloyed goods in other jurisdictions, and as a result
bills of rights in these places are likely to include provisions that
establish specific limitations on rights, and even statements of
responsibilities.9 They may authorize and facilitate the establishment of
6. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2 (§§ 7-39).
7. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 14 (right to privacy); ICCPR, supra note 3,
art. 17(1) (same).
8. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 10 (right to human dignity); ICCPR, supra
note 3, art. 17(1) (right to protection from unlawful attacks on honour and reputation).
The South African Bill of Rights sets out a number of positive economic and social
rights. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST. 1996 §§ 26, 27, 29 (setting forth the right to housing;
the right to health care, food, water, and social security; and the right to education,
respectively). The Canadian Charter appears to be a more orthodox statement of civil
and political rights by comparison, but the Supreme Court of Canada has suggested that
there may be scope for its guarantees to be interpreted as establishing positive economic
and social rights. See Grant Huscroft, A Constitutional “Work in Progress”? The
Charter and the Limits of Progressive Interpretation, 23 SUP. CT. L. REV. 2D 413, 434-37
(2004) (Can.), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE CHARTER ERA 413, 434-37 (Grant
Huscroft & Ian Brodie eds., 2004) (criticizing Gosselin v. Quebec (Att’y Gen.), [2002] 4
S.C.R. 429). Conversely, some rights set out in the U.S. Bill of Rights have no
international counterpart, and indeed were deliberately omitted from other bills of rights.
The Second Amendment right to bear arms is the most obvious example here. The right
to property is often another example.
9. For example, Article 19 of the ICCPR, supra note 3, sets out particular limits
on freedom of expression, in addition to asserting that the exercise of the right carries
with it particular responsibilities:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form
of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries
with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to
certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and
are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public),
or of public health or morals.
Id.
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additional limitations on rights in order to ensure that the pursuit of state
action is not stymied or unduly restricted.10 At the same time, debate
about the extent to which rights apply or should apply to limit the power
of private parties, as opposed to state actors, remains ongoing.11
So while the idea of rights-based constitutionalism has spread, there
are substantial differences between the U.S. Bill of Rights and more
modern bills of rights, differences that extend beyond degree to matters
of kind. The same is true of the concept of judicial review itself.
“Strong” judicial review12—the ability of judges not only to hold
legislation unconstitutional but to deny it legal effect—is now well
established in the United States. The premise once asserted so
Moreover, the ICCPR includes a positive obligation on states to enact hate speech
legislation. Id. at art. 20(2).
Equality rights provide another good example. Bills of rights that include an equality
provision typically include a provision ensuring that “affirmative action” programmes are
not found to be inconsistent. This is not necessarily viewed as a limit on the right to
equality, however; some such provisions are considered as an example of equality in
action. See Canadian Charter, supra note 5, § 15(2); Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R.
950 (discussing section 15(2)); see also New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 1990 S.N.Z.
No. 109, § 19(2); S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 9(2). The ICCPR includes a general nondiscrimination guarantee, but is silent on affirmative action. Nevertheless, the United
Nations Human Rights Committee has stated that the principle of equality sometimes
requires states to take action to redress conditions that cause or perpetuate discrimination,
and that preferential treatment is legitimate. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council (ECOSOC),
Comm’n on Human Rights, General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination (1989),
reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies 146, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (2004), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/comments.htm.
10. The Canadian Charter is the model here. The first provision in the Charter
purports to guarantee the enumerated rights and freedoms, while at the same time
providing that those rights and freedoms may be subject to “such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”
Canadian Charter, supra note 5, § 1. Section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act
1990 is modeled on section 1 of the Canadian Charter. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act
1990, 1990 S.N.Z. No. 109. The South African Bill of Rights contains a more detailed,
but essentially similar provision. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 36.
11. The state action doctrine remains a matter of controversy even in the United
States. See Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional Rights, 102
MICH. L. REV. 387 (2003) (proposing a new approach). Extensive debate has occurred
about the possible horizontal application of the United Kingdom Human Rights Act, 1998,
c. 42. See Ian Leigh, The UK’s Human Rights Act 1998: An Early Assessment, in
LITIGATING RIGHTS: PERSPECTIVES FROM DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 323, 336-42
(Grant Huscroft & Paul Rishworth eds., 2002). In Canada, the leading case is Retail,
Wholesale & Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R.
573, discussed in PETER W. HOGG, 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA § 34(2)h (4th
looseleaf ed. 1997 & Supp. 2005). In New Zealand, see PAUL RISHWORTH, GRANT
HUSCROFT, SCOTT OPTICAN, & RICHARD MAHONEY, THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF
RIGHTS 99-109 (2003). In some countries constitutional rights apply to private as well
as public parties. South Africa is an example in this regard. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 8.
12. On the strong-weak dichotomy, see Mark Tushnet, Judicial Review of
Legislation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 164 (Peter Cane & Mark
Tushnet eds., 2003).
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controversially by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison—“It is,
emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say
what the law is”13—is now taken for granted. Yet the spread of bills of
rights (even bills of rights that are broader in scope than the U.S. model)
has not always been accompanied by the spread of strong judicial
review. A weaker form of judicial review exists in countries like the
United Kingdom and New Zealand, where judges are specifically
precluded from “striking down” legislation on the basis of inconsistency
with protected rights. Canadian judges have greater power. They may
“strike down” legislation they find to be inconsistent with protected
rights, but in theory they do not have the last word: provincial
legislatures and the Federal Parliament can, to a limited extent, legislate
“notwithstanding” Charter rights.14
Whether judicial review is characterized as strong or weak, or even
something in between, there are important differences in the bodies of
case law that different bills of rights have spawned. The vast body of
law developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in interpreting the U.S. Bill of
Rights was once prominent in the decisions of foreign courts and
international tribunals charged with interpreting bills of rights.
Increasingly, however, it seems less relevant.15 In some ways this was
an inevitable development; constitutional rights may have American

13. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). Cf. Randy E. Barnett, The Original
Meaning of the Judicial Power (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 03-18, 2003), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=437040.
14. The Canadian Charter allows ordinary legislation to be passed
“notwithstanding” most, but not all Charter rights, but only for five-year, renewable
terms. Canadian Charter, supra note 5, § 33. The notwithstanding clause does not apply
retroactively. Ford v. Quebec (Att’y Gen.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, 788. The impact of the
notwithstanding clause is widely misunderstood and its effects exaggerated. In our view
the Canadian setup, in practice, mimics the United States in giving the judges the last
word. See infra text accompanying note 72.
15. The use of American authority in Canadian courts, where it might be expected
to be most relevant, has decreased as the body of Charter case law has grown. See Claire
L’Heureux-Dubé, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International
Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 29-30 (1998) (tying the diminished
authority of American law in Canada and in other countries to the Rehnquist Court).
Early in the life of the Charter, the Supreme Court of Canada warned against “drawing
too ready a parallel between constitutions born to different countries in different ages
and in very different circumstances . . . .” Rahey v. The Queen, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588,
639 (La Forest, J.); see also PETER W. HOGG, 1 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA § 3.5
(4th looseleaf ed. 1997 & Supp. 2005).
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parents, but children outgrow their parents and go their own way.16 The
question we pose is, should the children be welcomed home? To what
extent, if any, should American courts heed the rights jurisprudence of
foreign courts and international tribunals?
There is no doubt that internationalism, as we will call it, is the order
of the day in many courts.17 However, there is a significant difference:
modern bills of rights may permit, if not require, consideration of the
decisions of foreign courts and international tribunals. The New
Zealand Bill of Rights is an example of the permissive approach. Its
preamble affirms New Zealand’s commitment to the ICCPR, and the
similarity of its provisions to those of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms was intended to make Canadian precedents relevant in
New Zealand.18 The South African Bill of Rights is an example of the
mandatory approach. It specifically instructs South African courts to
have regard to international law in interpreting it, while making clear
that reference to foreign law is permissible.19 The United Kingdom
Human Rights Act is another example of the mandatory approach.
Among other things, it specifically requires courts in the United
Kingdom to take into account the decisions and advisory opinions of the
European Court of Human Rights interpreting the ECHR.20
No such authorization or instruction is found in the U.S. Bill of
Rights, and until recently the U.S. Supreme Court has generally been
dismissive of the human rights jurisprudence of foreign courts and

16. The rights as children metaphor was used by Judge Guido Calabresi in his
concurring opinion in United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Wise
parents do not hesitate to learn from their children.”).
17. Countries that once turned to England for guidance in the development of the
common law and constitutional law began to look beyond the United Kingdom for
influences once ties to the English legal system, and in particular the formal authority of
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, began to wane and ultimately ceased. See
L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 15, at 17-21. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
was the highest court in Canada until 1949; in Australia, Privy Council jurisdiction
remained in limited form until 1986, and in New Zealand until 2004. On the abolition of
Privy Council appeals, see HOGG, supra note 15, § 8.2.
18. In its White Paper proposing the New Zealand Bill of Rights, the Government
noted that “reference to the International Covenant in the preamble will open the way for
the courts to refer to the Covenant in interpreting and applying the Bill.” MINISTRY OF
JUSTICE, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR NEW ZEALAND: A WHITE PAPER, 1985, A.J.H.R. A.6 §
10.13 [hereinafter White Paper]. Moreover, it is clear from the White Paper that many
important decisions in the drafting of the New Zealand Bill of Rights were made in order
to facilitate the importation of case law from foreign courts. One reason proffered for
adopting a general reasonable limits provision based on the Canadian Charter was that
“New Zealand courts will be able, in this respect as in others, to take advantage of the
developing jurisprudence of the Canadian courts” Id. at § 10.26(e).
19. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 39(1).
20. Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42 § 2(1).
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international tribunals, if it has noticed it at all.21 Of course, foreign and
international developments have not been ignored completely. In
Furman v. Georgia,22 for example, some members of the Court canvassed
legislative developments in Canada and the United Kingdom abolishing
capital punishment in discussing the requirements of the Eighth
Amendment.23 Likewise, sporadic reference to foreign legislation and
case law can be found in various other cases—and not always by
proponents of internationalism24—but it could not be said to have had
any significant influence on their outcomes.
This appears to be changing at least for some of the Justices of the
U.S. Supreme Court. The most significant use of foreign authority by
the Supreme Court occurs in recent controversial cases such as
25
Lawrence v. Texas and Roper v. Simmons,26 both of which involve
changes in constitutional law, and both of which reveal deep divisions
within the Court as to the relevance and legitimacy of the use of foreign
authority. In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court cites
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights27 in contradicting a
21. Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of
Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 832 (1999) (describing the
unwillingness of American courts to consider foreign jurisprudence as reflecting “an
attitude of legal hegemony”).
22. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
23. Id.; see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) (citing the
laws of several countries in regard to the death penalty and juvenile offenders).
24. See, for example, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 945 n.1 (1992), in which Chief Justice Rehnquist cites and contrasts
Canadian and West German decisions on the constitutionality of abortion regulation in
his dissenting opinion. The Chief Justice cites case law and legislative developments in
making the point that assisted suicide is an issue in a number of countries in Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 718 n.16 (1997). In Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003), Justice Ginsburg’s concurring opinion, with which Justice Breyer joined,
referred to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, which the United States has ratified, and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which it has not, in making
the point that the Court’s approach to affirmative action (allowing it, subject to an end
point) was in accordance with the international standards they established. Bollinger,
539 U.S. at 344. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discussing the
Conventions).
25. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
26. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
27. The Court cited Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 1981 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R.
444, to demonstrate that the claimed right to engage in private homosexual conduct was
not insubstantial in Western civilization. Kennedy writes:
To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it
should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected
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central holding of Bowers v. Hardwick,28 which the Court overruled.
Among other things, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Roper
refers to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the
ICCPR, and the abolition of the death penalty in the United Kingdom
and in countries that once executed juveniles in concluding that the
Eighth Amendment precludes the execution of juveniles.29 Justice
Kennedy notes that the “overwhelming weight of international opinion
[is] against the juvenile death penalty . . . .”30
The debate has continued outside the parameters of the Court’s
constitutional decisions. Justices Breyer and Ginsburg have gone out of
their way to promote the use of foreign authority on several occasions.31
The unprecedented public debate between Justices Scalia and Breyer in
2005 is further proof of the importance of the unfolding controversy.32

elsewhere. The European Court of Human Rights has followed not Bowers but
its own decision in Dudgeon v United Kingdom. See P.G. & J.H. v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 00044787/98, ¶ 56 (Eur. Ct. H. R., Sept. 25, 2001);
Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1993); Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct.
H. R. (1988). Other nations, too, have taken action consistent with an
affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate,
consensual conduct. See Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as Amici Curiae 11-12.
The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part
of human freedom in many other countries. There has been no showing that in
this country the governmental interest in circumscribing personal choice is
somehow more legitimate or urgent.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-77.
28. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
29. Roper, 543 U.S. at 576; Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37, adopted
Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 43, 55.
30. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. Justice Kennedy describes world opinion as not
controlling, but rather as providing respected and significant confirmation of the Court’s
conclusion. Justice O’Connor criticizes the Court’s result, noting that “evidence of an
international consensus does not alter my determination that the Eighth Amendment does
not, at this time, forbid capital punishment of 17-year-old murderers in all cases.” Id. at
604 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). At the same time, however, she
repudiates Justice Scalia’s view that foreign and international precedents have no place
in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Id. As Justice Scalia puts it: “the basic premise of
the Court’s argument—that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the
world—ought to be rejected out of hand.” Id. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
31. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address to American Society of
International Law (Apr. 4, 2003), in 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265 (2003); Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, Keynote Address to the
American Society of International Law (Apr. 1, 2005), in 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC.
(forthcoming Jan. 2006), available at http://www.asil.org/events/AM05/ginsburg050401.
html; An Open Discussion with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1033,
1040-42 (2004).
32. See Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, The Relevance of Foreign Legal
Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases, A Conversation Before the U.S. Association of
Constitutional Law (Jan. 13, 2005), in 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519 (2005).
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Despite these developments, in our view the use of foreign and
international law in interpreting the U.S. Bill of Rights is for the most
part undertheorized.33 Nor has the U.S. Supreme Court justified or
explained the use of foreign materials in the few cases in which they are
cited. Even Sanford Levinson, who describes himself as someone who
identifies with “cosmopolitanism” rather than “parochialism,”34 says of
the Court:
To be sure, they cite foreign materials, especially when they are in accordance
with what one suspects are pre-existing views. What seems strikingly lacking,
though, is any real analysis of them or explanation, beyond the ostensible force
provided by their very existence, of why we should be impressed by them.35

For many proponents, the case for rights-based internationalism in
American courts is self-evident, and requires no justification. We
disagree.
To put it bluntly, what is added to the persuasiveness of a rights-based
argument in an American court by indicating that a similar argument
based on a different bill of rights has been accepted by a foreign court or
international tribunal? It seems that just about any argument about
rights can already be made in an American court. Nothing precludes one
from making a novel or unusual argument. Hence the point of invoking
international authority is not simply to allow new arguments to be made;
rather, it is an attempt to confer some sort of higher status on an
argument, and so a greater level of persuasiveness than it would
otherwise have. Moreover, this increased persuasiveness is supposed to
follow simply because a similar argument has been accepted elsewhere.
This raises another question: What is it about foreign judges and
members of international tribunals that makes their views on rights
questions presumptively persuasive? Why might one think their views
on moral questions are better than those of American voters, legislators,
and judges?
33. For more general treatments of internationalism, see Choudhry, supra note 21;
Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT’L. L.
409 (2003); Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational
Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 499 (2000);
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 191 (2003).
34. Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad when Interpreting the U.S. Constitution:
Some Reflections, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 353, 363 (2004). Levinson adds: “I am no fan of
Justice Scalia. I find his militant provincialism embarrassing; I much prefer the
cosmopolitanism expressed by the Canadian justices and by Justice Breyer.” Id. at 358.
35. Id. at 362.
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The unspoken premise need not be that internationalism leads to
better answers; rather, it might just be that internationalism facilitates
different answers, and so may help to mitigate some of the more
conservative strictures of the Court’s doctrine. The decisions of
foreign courts and international tribunals are increasingly more
politically liberal than those of their American counterparts, and hence
more to the liking of rights-claimants. The President of the American
Civil Liberties Union, Professor Nadine Strossen, is surprisingly
candid in advocating the use of foreign authority in interpreting the
U.S. Bill of Rights on this basis:
In the ACLU’s ideal world, all individual rights would receive the maximum
protection consistent with civil libertarian principles, and, in support of our
claims for each right, we would cite whatever source of legal authority offered
the most protection—not only the US Constitution, but also, alternatively, state
constitutions, federal or state statutes, or international human rights principles.
This is an upward-ratcheting approach. In other words, the US Constitution—as
interpreted by the Supreme Court—sets a floor under our individual rights, but
it should not set up a ceiling over them.
Under this civil libertarian approach, to the extent that increased protection for
individual rights is offered by other binding legal authorities, domestic or
international, they should prevail over US constitutional law. In contrast,
though, whenever these other authorities purport to undermine rights protected
by the US Constitution, the Constitution trumps them. In the same vein, we
believe that government officials should respect fundamental rights even if they
are not expressly articulated in any constitution, treaty, or any other explicit
source of law.36

Leave aside the obvious rejoinder that people disagree about how
rights ought to play out, and about what is their “maximum protection
consistent with civil libertarian principles.” A further initial, preliminary
response to such views as Professor Strossen articulates is that
comparative rights-based work is difficult at the best of times, and the
difficulty increases as the interpretive enterprise broadens. Constraints
exist of both a practical and subjective nature. Practical constraints
include limits not only on the expertise of counsel (not to mention limits
on clients’ ability to pay for this sort of work), but also on the expertise
of courts, even assuming their openness to internationalism.37 So where

36. Nadine Strossen, Liberty and Equality: Complementary, Not Competing,
Constitutional Commitments, in LITIGATING RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 149, 153
(footnotes omitted).
37. Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé of the Supreme Court of Canada once
lamented that although Canadian law is cited by courts in countries like Zimbabwe,
South Africa, and Israel, litigants in the Supreme Court of Canada “do not put [cases
from these countries] before us as often as they should.” L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note
15, at 27. The reference to Zimbabwe stands out like a sore thumb, but it is not the first
time that country’s jurisprudence has been invoked by a judge promoting
internationalism: Justice Breyer acknowledged that he “may have made what one might
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does internationalism begin and end? The answer is that the limits on
internationalism are likely to coincide with the normative preferences of
the party advancing the international perspective. Counsel are likely to
cite the decisions of foreign courts and international tribunals that favour
their position rather than participating in the sort of global rights
dialogue some romanticize.38
Thus, even courts open to internationalism are unlikely to have a
complete picture put before them. More likely, they will have a
snapshot of a particular aspect of law from a few countries, which may
or may not be representative of the array of international approaches on
offer. Those countries are more likely to have common law legal
systems than civilian; more likely to be English-speaking than any other
language; more likely to be European than Asian; and so on. Numerous
political factors may be relevant when proffering foreign law. Likewise,
it would be most surprising if even courts otherwise open to
internationalism were not selective about the jurisprudence they were
willing to take into account. As Fred Schauer has hypothesized:
The political reputation of the donor country, both internationally and in the
recipient country, is a causal factor in determining the degree of reception in the
recipient country of the donor country’s legal ideas, norms, and institutions,
even holding constant the host country’s evaluation of the intrinsic legal worth
of those ideas, norms, and institutions, and even holding constant the actual
legal worth of those ideas, norms, and institutions.39

In other words, other than predicting that there will be few citations of
Zimbabwean authority, it is difficult to be more specific.40 Courts
call a tactical error in referring to a case from Zimbabwe—not the human rights capital
of the world.” Scalia & Breyer, supra note 32, at 528.
38. Of course courts may well ask clerks to research the decisions of foreign courts
and international tribunals, but this poses its own difficulties, quite apart from the
problems of legitimacy that arise when courts consider material not put before them by
counsel. Presumably once courts demonstrate an interest in particular case law, counsel
will do their best to oblige. On the notion of “dialogue,” see infra Part III.F.
39. Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of Legal Transplantation, in
GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 253, 258 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & John D. Donahue
eds., 2000).
40. Schauer speculates on the reasons why the decisions of some countries may be
more likely than others to be influential internationally. Id. at 258-61. In addition to the
reasons he proffers, it is fair to say that courts are more likely to be apprised of the
decisions of a foreign court when counsel are comfortable with the law of the relevant
jurisdiction. The movement of lawyers and the international experience they bring with
them makes them more likely to be conversant in more than one legal system than in the
past.
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receptive to internationalism do not explain why they cite particular
authority in particular circumstances, still less do they say why that
authority should be preferred to authority that is not canvassed—authority
that may be quite different.41
That initial, preliminary response notwithstanding, we emphasize that
our concern is not with internationalism per se, but with internationalism
in American courts. There is no doubt that that there is increasing
pressure on U.S. courts (not least from legal academics) to accept the
decisions of foreign courts and international tribunals as relevant, if not
persuasive authority in interpreting the U.S. Bill of Rights.42 American
courts are accused of being old-fashioned, if not parochial; of failing to
understand that human rights are a global concern; and of failing to
appreciate that state-based conceptions of human rights are inadequate,
if not incoherent. With so many courts and tribunals in the rights
business, why not benefit from their experience? Why not welcome the
children home?
The answer, we suggest, is that international rights jurisprudence has
less in common with American law than is usually assumed. The
children have changed significantly since they left home. Foreign courts
and international tribunals speak the same language of rights, but they
have different understandings of what rights are, and how they are to be
understood. Not just that, but conceptions of the state and its role, and
the role of courts, differ widely. Many countries have a conception of
democracy that is far less majoritarian, and far less concerned with
institutional checks and balances than the American model. The very
basics of American constitutionalism are, in important ways, foreign to
many of the jurisdictions that have adopted bills of rights.
These differences are important to those who are concerned with the
countermajoritarian difficulty,43 where the fear is of unelected judges
interpreting vague, amorphous rights guarantees so as to frustrate the
will of the elected representatives of the people. However, they matter
even to those who are relatively unconcerned or sanguine about
41. McCrudden, supra note 33, at 515-16, argues not only that judges should cite
international authority that they have relied on, but also that the criteria they used to
determine which international decisions they relied on should be acknowledged.
42. Pressure to do so also comes from the judges of foreign courts. See, e.g.,
Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a
Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16 (2002) (regretting the U.S. Supreme Court’s historic
unwillingness to consider foreign authority); Gérard V. La Forest, The Use of American
Precedents in Canadian Courts, 46 ME. L. REV. 211 (1994) (suggesting that America
could benefit from considering the decisions of Canadian courts); L’Heureux-Dubé,
supra note 15, at 39-40 (lamenting the failure of the Rehnquist Court to consider
Canadian precedents (among other things)).
43. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (2d ed. 1986).
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American judges using the American Bill of Rights to gainsay American
legislators. Gainsaying the decisions of American legislators on the
basis of the decisions of foreign courts or international tribunals is
harder to justify; it can call in aid a smaller (and in our view less
convincing) set of possible justifications for overriding the will of the
elected representatives of the people.
In this article we argue that internationalism poses significant
challenges for American constitutionalism that have not adequately been
acknowledged by its promoters.
Our argument will come in three parts. In the first part, we will set out
some of the main features of human rights jurisprudence in other
countries with bills of rights and under international law, highlighting
those features that distinguish it from American law.
In the second part of this article we will consider the main arguments
employed to justify and defend the power exercised by judges under
bills of rights-style instruments. We will indicate which of those
justifications we think are potentially applicable when a domestic bill of
rights is the source of the judges’ power. Likewise, we will indicate
which of those justifications we think are potentially applicable when it
is the decisions of foreign courts and international tribunals that are
being raised (and in some sense relied upon) to justify the exercise of
judicial power. Our conclusion will be that in the latter case the
potential justifications are fewer.
In the third and final part of this article, we will look at recent case
law from Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom and indicate
what may lie in store if internationalism becomes commonplace in
American courts. We will argue that there has been a noticeable, and in
our view undesirable, ratcheting-up effect in the rights-based
jurisprudence of these common law legal systems as each draws on the
most expansive case law of the others. It is the importation of this
jurisprudence—a jurisprudence based on a similar abstract rights
language but different concrete understandings and constitutional
premises—that in our view raises concerns for American constitutionalism,
concerns that cannot easily (if at all) be assuaged. Nor can such a
practice easily be justified. It cannot easily be justified by those who
think the right of all to participate in social decisionmaking lies at the
heart of democracy and needs protecting; more tellingly, it cannot easily
be justified even by those who support judicial review under a domestic
bill of rights.
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II. PART I—THE SPREAD OF RIGHTS-BASED CONSTITUTIONALISM
A. Post WWII Developments
Consider the number of international human rights instruments to
which most democracies—and not just democracies—have acceded
since the end of World War II. The main three, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)44 and the two covenants it
spawned, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR),45 and the ICCPR, are often referred to as the
International Bill of Rights. The UDHR is a statement of aspirations,
but it nevertheless sets the tone for the adoption of the latter two treaties,
which include dozens of rights that are prescribed in one form or
another. These span from basic protections (such as the right to life,46 or
to liberty and security of the person47), to somewhat vaguer entitlements
(such as the economic, social, and cultural rights said to be indispensable
for one’s dignity and the free development of one’s personality48), to
rights that for many people in the world are best described as “wishful
thinking” (such as the right to rest and leisure,49 or the right to a standard
of living adequate for the health and well being of oneself and his or her
family, including food, clothing, housing, medical care, and necessary
social services50). And that is just to mention the main international
human rights instruments.51 A variety of specific international treaties
address such things as racial discrimination,52 discrimination against

44. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
45. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (in force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
46. UDHR, supra note 44, art. 3; ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 6.
47. UDHR, supra note 44, art. 3; ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 9(1).
48. UDHR, supra note 44, art. 22; ICESCR, supra note 45, arts. 9, 15.
49. UDHR, supra note 44, art. 24; ICESCR, supra note 45, art. 7(d).
50. UDHR, supra note 44, art. 25(1); ICESCR, supra note 45, art. 11(1).
51. On international human rights generally, see A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G.
MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD (4th ed. 1996). On the ICCPR, see ALEX
CONTE, SCOTT DAVIDSON & RICHARD BURCHILL, DEFINING CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS:
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE (2004), and
SARAH JOSEPH, JENNY SCHULTZ & MELISSA CASTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIAL, AND COMMENTARY (2d ed. 2004).
52. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened
for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
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women,53 and so on—some, but not all of which the United States has
acceded to in whole or in part.54
A more complete account of the International Bill of Rights would go
on to clarify that the rights protected by the ICCPR were meant to be
realized by signatory states immediately, while those protected by the
ICESCR were meant to be realized progressively. It would go on to
explain the reporting obligation on member states and the subsequent
establishment of an optional protocol that allows individuals to bring
complaints against their states for violating the ICCPR to the United
Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), an enforcement
mechanism that supplements the obligations those states owe to one
another.55 However, for our purposes we do not need to paint such a
complete account. We want only to trace the main features of
international rights jurisprudence and to show its effect on other
common law legal systems.
Recall that it was only in the last half of the twentieth century, and
more particularly in the last two or three decades, that rights-based
constitutionalism was widely adopted elsewhere. Recall, too, that the
U.S. Bill of Rights led by example, though the International Bill of
Rights has also provided inspiration for the adoption of bills of rights in

53. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; Optional Protocol to the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 54/4,
Annex, U.N. DOC. A/Res/54/4/Annex (Oct. 15, 1999).
54. Proponents of international human rights are fond of pointing out that the
United States is one of only two countries (the other being Somalia) that have signed, but
never ratified, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 29. Indeed, Justice
Ginsburg has lamented that the United States has not yet ratified the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, supra note 53. Ginsburg,
supra note 31 (“sadly, the United States has not yet ratified”). The anodyne nature of
these sorts of treaties facilitates the criticism: How could anyone be against concepts like
the best interests of children? The problem, of course, is that these sorts of terms come
to mean very different things in a variety of contexts when interpreted by the expert
bodies that oversee the treaties, not to mention the domestic courts that may rely on them
to reshape national law. In Australia, see Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs v. Teoh, (1995) 183 C.L.R. 273; in Canada, see Baker v. Minister of Citizenship
& Immigration, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, both involving deportation decisions.
55. On the legal significance of decisions of the UNHRC, see Scott Davidson,
Intention and Effect: The Legal Status of the Final Views of the Human Rights
Committee, in LITIGATING RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 305, and Elizabeth Evatt, The
Impact of International Human Rights on Domestic Law, in LITIGATING RIGHTS, supra
note 11, at 281.
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many countries.56 Canada entrenched its Charter of Rights and
Freedoms as part of a massive package of constitutional reform in
1982;57 New Zealand enacted the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act,58 a
statutory bill of rights, in 1990; South Africa entrenched its Constitution,
which includes a bill of rights, in 1996;59 and in 1998 the United
Kingdom enacted the United Kingdom Human Rights Act, a statutory
bill of rights that incorporates the ECHR into domestic law.60 Save for
Australia, where there is still no bill of rights at the Commonwealth or
State level,61 rights-based constitutionalism has become a defining
56. The UNHRC has on several occasions expressed the view that accession to the
ICCPR entails the obligation to adopt a bill of rights. The Committee’s view is usually
expressed in terms of regret. For example, the Committee has expressed regret that New
Zealand adopted a statutory bill of rights rather than a constitutional model, and that its
bill of rights precludes judges from striking down legislation, as discussed infra Part
II.B.2.
See U.N. General Assembly, Human Rights Committee, Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Committee: New Zealand 03/10/1995, U.N. DOC.
CCPR/C/79/Add. 47; A/50/40, paras. 166-91 (Oct. 3, 1995). This view that the ICCPR
requires the adoption of a bill of rights, or any particular bill of rights, is plainly
erroneous. The ICCPR requires that the rights it protects be observed by member states,
but the way in which a country complies with the ICCPR is a matter for that country to
determine. Rights may be protected by legislation and common law, among other things.
See Janet McLean, Legislative Invalidation, Human Rights Protection and s 4 of the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 4 N.Z. L. REV. 421 (2001) (answering the UNHRC’s criticism
of New Zealand); see also Matadeen v. Pointu (1999) 1 A.C. 98 (P.C.) (appeal taken
from Mauritius).
57. Passage of the Canada Act 1982 by the U.K. Parliament, often referred to as
the patriation of the Canadian Constitution, established a domestic amending formula,
whereas prior to 1982 formal amendments to the Canadian Constitution had to be
approved by the U.K. Parliament. See HOGG, supra note 15, §§ 1.3-1.4. A number of
amendments to the Canadian Constitution were effected by the Canada Act in 1982, the
most significant being the inclusion of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the
first thirty-four provisions of the Canada Act 1982. See Canadian Charter, supra note 5.
Prior to the adoption of the Charter, Canada had a statutory bill of rights at the federal
level. The Canadian Bill of Rights 1960 is now largely redundant, although it is
noteworthy that this Act includes a right to the protection of property that the Charter
does not, along with additional procedural due process protections, and so may
supplement Charter protections against the federal government in some contexts.
58. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 1990 S.N.Z. No. 109.
59. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2 and supra text accompanying note 6.
60. Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42 § 2.
61. In 2004 the Australian Capital City of Canberra, which is known as the ACT
or Australian Capital Territory (not a part of any of the Australian States, its status being
akin to that of the District of Columbia), enacted a statutory bill of rights. There is, of
course, ongoing academic interest in the adoption of a bill of rights. See, e.g., GEORGE
WILLIAMS, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR AUSTRALIA (2000). On the other hand, there are strong
antipodean opponents of bills of rights. See, e.g., JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE
SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT (1999); James Allan, A Defence of the Status Quo, in
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS 175 (Tom Campbell, Jeffrey
Goldsworthy & Adrienne Stone eds., 2003); Tom Campbell, Judicial Activism—Justice or
Treason?, 10 OTAGO L. REV. 307 (2003). The State of Victoria appointed a Committee to
investigate the adoption of a statutory bill of rights in 2005, led by Professor Williams.
Professor Williams’s committee issued a report in January 2006 recommending the
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feature of most English-speaking common law legal systems, and many
other legal systems as well.
B. How Other Bills of Rights Work
In order to see how bills of rights work in other countries, let us
consider the experience of Canada, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom, three common law countries that have recently adopted bills
of rights.
1. Canada
As we noted, Canada has an entrenched bill of rights that includes a
detailed list of rights and freedoms. Two main features distinguish the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) from the U.S. Bill
of Rights. First, the Charter includes an explicit abridging provision,
section 1, which guarantees the enumerated rights and freedoms but at
the same time declares that those rights and freedoms are subject to
reasonable limits. Thus, legislation is consistent with the Charter if the
limits it imposes on rights are considered reasonable and justified in a
free and democratic society.62
Some Canadian commentators argue that this feature makes rights
adjudication under the Charter qualitatively different than under the U.S.
Bill of Rights.63 The Charter, they say, does not protect rights
absolutely, the suggestion being that the U.S. Bill of Rights does. In our
view this reflects a basic misunderstanding.64 The difference between
rights adjudication in the two countries is that rights adjudication is
broken down into a two-step process under the Canadian Charter,
whereas under the U.S. Bill of Rights the two steps are merged. Under
adoption of a state bill of rights. STATE OF VICTORIA, DEPT. OF JUSTICE, RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILITIES AND RESPECT: THE REPORT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CONSULTATION
COMMITTEE (2005), available at http://www.justice.vic.gov.au/CA256902000FE154/
Lookup/HR_Report/$file/HumanRightsFinal_FULL.pdf.
62. Section 1 of the Canadian Charter, supra note 5, provides as follows: “The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in
it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.”
63. See, e.g., KENT ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR
DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE (2001) (Can.).
64. See James Allan, The Author Doth Protest Too Much, Methinks, 20 N.Z. U. L.
REV. 519 (2003); Mark Tushnet, Judicial Activism or Restraint in a Section 33 World, 53
U. TORONTO L.J. 89 (2003) (both reviewing ROACH, supra note 63).
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the Charter, rights are defined without regard to the justification for
limiting them. As a result, it may be meaningless to speak of rights in
Canada without taking into account the justifiability of particular
limitations. In contrast, to say that someone has a right under the U.S.
Bill of Rights is to make the stronger claim that there is no justification
for limiting an individual’s freedom. The Canadian two-step process
allows judges to define rights generously, because the real work comes
at the justificatory enquiry that follows. The difference is largely one of
form rather than substance. The leading Canadian case delineating the
scope of permissible limitations on Charter rights, R. v. Oakes,65
establishes a proportionality test with which American courts have long
been familiar.66
In neither country, then, are rights generally treated as absolutes.67
The real question is the extent to which limitations are upheld by the
highest courts in the two countries, and there is no doubt that the
Supreme Court of Canada has reached results different, if not opposite,
to those reached by the U.S. Supreme Court in a number of comparable
leading cases. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada has, like the
U.S. Supreme Court, held that the freedom of expression protects speech
without regard to its content.68 However, this holding is not equivalent
to the meaningful “content neutrality” idea in First Amendment law. In
Canada, content neutrality means only that expression enjoys prima facie
constitutional protection regardless of its content. Anything with
expressive content is, in other words, within the ambit of the protected
freedom, and the state must justify the establishment of limits upon the
freedom of expression. At the justificatory stage, however, the content
of expression is relevant not only to the state’s reasons for establishing
limits upon it, but to the extent to which particular limits can be justified.

65. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. See generally HOGG, supra note 11, § 35.
66. Compare the test under Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 138-39, with the test set out
by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating limitations on commercial speech in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
67. The Supreme Court of Canada has often asserted that all rights are subject to
the reasonable limits clause in the Charter, see, e.g., R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, 95,
but this appears to us to be an overstatement. As a practical matter, some rights are
treated as absolutes. For example, it is inconceivable that a Canadian court would
conclude that legislation infringing the right not to be subject to cruel or unusual
treatment or punishment, Canadian Charter, supra note 5, § 12, is justified. A court
minded to uphold treatment or punishment in difficult circumstances would likely
conclude that the right had not been breached. Accord HOGG, supra note 11, § 35.14(f).
68. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Att’y Gen.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927; see also R. v.
Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (protecting pornography); R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R.
697 (freedom protects “hate speech”).
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Pursuant to section 1, the state has been able to uphold significant
content-based restrictions in a variety of contexts.69
The reasonable limits provision allows a measure of deference to
Canadian legislatures, but a second key feature of the Charter cuts the
opposite way. Section 33, the “notwithstanding clause,” authorizes both
the Federal Parliament and provincial legislatures to legislate
“notwithstanding” some (but not all) Charter rights—to pass ordinary
legislation that applies regardless of those Charter rights.70 This clause
was crucial to the passage of the Charter. The provinces insisted on it as
the price of their consent to the package of constitutional amendments
that included the Charter,71 but it has not proven to be the provision that
either its proponents assumed or its opponents feared.
69. So, for example, the criminalization of obscene material and hate speech has
been upheld. See Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 497; Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 786.
70. Section 33 of the Charter provides as follows:
(1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act
of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a
provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in
section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter.
(2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a declaration made
under this section is in effect shall have such operation as it would have
but for the provision of this Charter referred to in the declaration.
(3) A declaration made under subsection (1) shall cease to have effect five
years after it comes into force or on such earlier date as may be specified
in the declaration.
(4) Parliament or the legislature of a province may re-enact a declaration
made under subsection (1).
(5) Subsection (3) applies in respect of a re-enactment made under subsection
(4).
Canadian Charter, supra note 5, § 33.
For a variety of views on section 33, see Jamie Cameron, The Charter’s Legislative
Override: Feat or Figment of the Constitutional Imagination?, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
THE CHARTER ERA, supra note 8, at 135; Janet L. Hiebert, Is it Too Late to Rehabilitate
Canada’s Notwithstanding Clause?, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE CHARTER ERA, supra
note 8, at 169; Tsvi Kahana, What Makes for a Good Use of the Notwithstanding
Mechanism?, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE CHARTER ERA, supra note 8, at 191; Howard
Leeson, Section 33, The Notwithstanding Clause: A Paper Tiger?, in JUDICIAL POWER
AND CANADIAN DEMOCRACY 297 (Paul Howe & Peter H. Russell eds., 2001); Peter H.
Russell, Standing Up for Notwithstanding, 29 ALTA L. REV. 293 (1991); John D. Whyte,
On Not Standing for Notwithstanding, 28 ALTA. L. REV 347 (1990). Based on his
concern about the power of the U.S. Supreme Court, Robert Bork’s suggestion that
consideration be given to amending the U.S. Constitution to establish a congressional
override in ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH 117-20 (1996), was
widely criticized.
71. Nine of ten Canadian provinces ended up consenting. Quebec did not agree
to the 1982 repatriation (from the United Kingdom) of the Canadian Constitution nor
to the addition of the Charter of Rights. Indeed, Quebec has never formally signed on
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Section 33 was designed to overcome concerns about empowering the
judiciary to override the decisions of the legislature, but it addresses this
concern only to a limited extent. By invoking this provision Canadian
legislatures can suspend the effect of judicial decisions interpreting some
Charter rights for nonretroactive,72 renewable five-year periods.73 The
automatic expiry of a notwithstanding declaration means that the default
position is judicial supremacy in interpreting the Charter.
The notwithstanding clause is often relied on by those who argue that
the Charter establishes a weaker form of judicial review than the U.S.
Bill of Rights because it denies courts the last word as to the meaning of
Charter rights. However, things are not what they seem. The notwithstanding
clause has never been used by the Federal Parliament—not one single
time—and has been disavowed by successive Prime Ministers since the
Charter was passed. Its use has come to be seen as undermining the
Charter, in part because judicial decisions interpreting the Charter have
come to be seen as synonymous with the Charter itself.74 Most
Canadians appear to have accepted what many Americans continue to
contest—the idea that the judiciary is the exclusive interpreter of the
Constitution, or at any rate the only branch of government whose views
matter. Even controversial and unpopular judicial decisions—cases the
federal government lost in court—have not been reversed by Parliament.
Indeed, no attempt has even been made to do so, despite the power
majority governments have in a Westminster parliamentary system.75
Examples of controversial decisions not overridden include one
extending the right to an oral hearing to thousands claiming refugee
status,76 one prohibiting the establishment of limits on tobacco
advertising,77 one causing thousands of persons charged with crimes to
be released on the basis that the state had taken too long to try them,78

to the Canadian Constitution, but it applies in Quebec in any event. See HOGG, supra
note 15, § 4.1(c).
72. This limitation on the clause was inferred by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Ford v. Quebec (Att’y Gen.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712.
73. Canadian Charter, supra note 5, § 33(3)-(5).
74. See Grant A. Huscroft, “Thank God We’re Here”: Judicial Exclusivity and its
Consequences, 25 SUP. CT. L. REV. 2D 241 (2004) (Can.).
75. A majority government describes the situation in which the governing political
party holds a majority of seats in the legislature or parliament. Strict party discipline,
which is typical in Westminster parliamentary government, means that all members of
the governing party almost always support legislation proposed by the government.
76. Singh v. Minister of Employment & Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177. The
decision in Singh has cost the federal government billions of dollars on an ongoing basis.
77. RJR-MacDonald, Inc. v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (five-four
decision).
78. R. v. Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199.
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and one establishing same-sex marriage,79 among others. Thus, the
decisions of Canadian courts are, in effect, final unless the Court
changes its mind.80 It is significant that, outside of Quebec (the only
province that opposed passage of the Canada Act 1982 which entrenched
the Charter), the notwithstanding clause has only ever been used three
times by provincial or territorial governments,81 and never to overturn a
judicial decision.82
Accordingly, the notwithstanding clause is essentially irrelevant as far
as provincial legislatures and the Federal Parliament are concerned. But
it may be highly relevant to courts in interpreting the Charter. Arguably,
the notwithstanding clause frees Canadian courts to be less deferential to
elected legislatures than they otherwise would have been in the absence
of such a clause, because it allows judges to act on the basis that their
79. Halpern v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), 65 O.R.3d 161 (2003). Not only was this
Ontario Court of Appeal decision not reversed by legislation, the Government
capitulated by refusing to appeal to the Supreme Court, then proposing to enact
legislation to extend the impact of the decision across the country—this only six years
following Parliament’s earlier affirmation of the traditional definition of marriage.
Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, 2000 S.C., ch. 12 (Can.). The
Government attempted to avoid political fallout by involving the Supreme Court of
Canada on an advisory basis, something permitted under Canadian law. Huscroft, supra
note 74, at 261 (discussing Government’s strategy). The Supreme Court of Canada
refused to advise whether or not the limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples
infringed the Charter, however, reasoning that there was no need to do so since the
Government had not appealed the decision in Halpern and had proposed legislation to
permit same-sex marriage in any event. See Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3
S.C.R. 698.
80. Which it does from time to time. The decision in Askov was softened
considerably in R. v. Morin, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771, which is now the leading case on
section 11(b) of the Charter, the right to be tried within a reasonable time.
81. Moreover, these three examples turn out to be irrelevant. See HOGG, supra note
11, § 36.2. Saskatchewan’s use of the notwithstanding clause in 1984 to protect collective
bargaining legislation was redundant because the Court held that the freedom of association
did not include the right to strike. Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union v.
Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460. Alberta’s invocation of the notwithstanding clause in
2000 to preserve the common law definition of marriage is irrelevant given that the
province does not have constitutional jurisdiction over the status of marriage. See SameSex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698. The third case involved territorial legislation that
included a notwithstanding declaration, but never came into effect. Land Planning and
Development Act, 1982 S.Y.T., ch. 22, § 39(1) (not yet in force), cited in HOGG, supra note
11, § 36.2 n.12a.
82. One consequence of judicial exclusivity is that it would appear to create an
incentive to invoke the notwithstanding clause in order to preempt judicial review, thus
immunizing the legislation from Charter scrutiny. See Ford v. Quebec (Att’y Gen.),
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (precluding the notwithstanding clause from being invoked
retrospectively creates a similar incentive). See HOGG, supra note 11, § 36.6.
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decisions are not final.83 Ironically, in other words, section 33 may have
the unintended consequence of making Canadian judges less deferential
to legislators than American judges, who decide constitutional cases
in the knowledge that their decisions can only be overturned by
constitutional amendment.
Whether or not this is the case, the fact is that the U.S. Supreme Court
has developed a number of techniques designed to facilitate judicial
deference—a more minimalist approach to judicial review—in order to
minimize the need to answer constitutional questions. More to the point,
these techniques are not used by the Supreme Court of Canada to the
same extent, as we will see below.
In sum, despite structural differences between the two bills of rights
and the analytical frameworks that must be used in interpreting and
applying them, judicial review under the Canadian Charter is similar to
judicial review under the U.S. Bill of Rights in that both are strong
forms of judicial review. Judicial deference is a feature of the
jurisprudence of both the Supreme Court of Canada and the U.S.
Supreme Court, but it is unpredictable: structural differences, as well as
political and cultural differences, may lead to very different results.
2. New Zealand and the United Kingdom
New Zealand and the United Kingdom are jurisdictions with unwritten
constitutions, meaning that neither country has an overarching document
that constitutes government and sets out the limits on power and how
separation is to be maintained. Both of these jurisdictions, however, do
have statutory bills of rights that are subject to the ordinary processes of
amendment.84 Thus, decisions interpreting the rights they protect can, at
least in theory, be undone by the passage of ordinary legislation. There
is no need for the sort of supermajority ordinarily required for a
constitutional amendment.
As we noted above, New Zealand’s Bill of Rights came first, and with
little fanfare. A proposal to adopt a supreme law bill of rights was
83. The judiciary sometimes has it both ways in this argument. In regard to the
few rights that are not subject to the notwithstanding clause, the Court has claimed that
heightened scrutiny is warranted as a result. See, e.g., Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral
Officer) (Sauvé II), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519. One might equally have argued that the
opposite conclusion is appropriate—that, given the need for a constitutional amendment
(virtually impossible to obtain) to overturn a judicial decision interpreting rights not
subject to the notwithstanding clause, judges should be more rather than less deferential
to the legislature in interpreting those rights.
84. The Constitution Act 1986 does some of the work a written constitution would
in New Zealand, but it is ordinary legislation, and there remains a considerable role for
unwritten constitutional norms in any event. See PHILIP A. JOSEPH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 112-16 (2d ed. 2001).
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strongly opposed85—ironically, by the New Zealand legal community,
among others—and in order to pass even a statutory bill of rights it was
necessary for the government to water down the proposal considerably.
In particular, a provision was added rendering the New Zealand Bill of
Rights subordinate to all other legislation in the event of a conflict—that
is, specifically precluding the courts from holding inconsistent
legislation of no force or effect, whether the other legislation was passed
prior to or following the passage of the New Zealand Bill of Rights.86
Against that, a reading-down provision was included. It instructs courts
to interpret other legislation consistently with the protected rights and
freedoms of the Bill of Rights, if they can. Only in the event that the
judges decide they cannot read the other statute’s provisions as
consistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights must the other legislation
prevail. In order to minimize the chances that future inconsistent
legislation would be passed, a provision was also added requiring the
Attorney General to report to Parliament whenever proposed legislation
was thought to be inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights.87
The changes were designed to preserve parliamentary sovereignty. Thus
the Prime Minister who proposed the bill referred to it as a “parliamentary
bill of rights.”88
This must seem to American eyes to be as enervated a bill of rights as
can be imagined.89 In practice, however, it has not worked out that
85. The history of the New Zealand Bill of Rights is discussed in RISHWORTH ET
supra note 11, ch. 1. See also James Allan, Turning Clark Kent into Superman: The
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 9 OTAGO L. REV. 613 (2000).
86. Section 4 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights provides as follows:
No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made before or
after the commencement of this Bill of Rights),—
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked,
or to be in any way invalid or ineffective; or
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment—by reason only that the
provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill of Rights.
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 1990 S.N.Z. No. 109. The impact of this
provision is discussed in RISHWORTH ET AL., supra note 11, at 126-31.
87. The idea here, borrowed from Canadian legislation, is that the legislature is
unlikely to pass legislation if apprised of its inconsistency. The flaw in this idea is the
assumption that questions of consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights are
matters of law amenable to brightline answers that legislators will or should accept. See
id., ch. 4.
88. 502 PARL. DEB., H.R. (1989) 13038 (N.Z.) (Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Palmer, moving
introduction of the Bill).
89. Justice Brennan, for example, considered that a statutory constitutional bill of
rights was of little use, and that judicial power to enforce constitutional rights as against
AL.,
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way.90 The “reasonable limits” provision based on section 1 of the
Canadian Charter, designed for use with a supreme-law bill of rights
model rather than a statutory model, was retained. New Zealand judges
have used this provision, together with the reading-down provision, in
creative ways.91 As a result, they are rarely required to conclude that
another statute’s wording is so plain that it must be read as inconsistent
with the New Zealand Bill of Rights. This interpretive power allows
New Zealand judges to achieve much of what an American judge could
do under the U.S. Bill of Rights;92 moreover, in the event that an
interpretive solution is not possible, New Zealand judges have asserted
that they have not only the power, but also the duty, to issue declarations
of inconsistency in appropriate circumstances.93
The New Zealand experience suggests that it is a mistake to assume
that statutory bills of rights necessarily establish a weak form of judicial
review where legislation is concerned. Much depends on how far the
judges are prepared to go in reading down otherwise clear statutory
language and whether or not the legislature is prepared to respond.
The New Zealand Bill of Rights was one of the models for the U.K.’s
Human Rights Act 1998, and in particular for the apparent preservation
of parliamentary sovereignty. Like their New Zealand counterparts,
U.K. judges were denied the power to strike down or invalidate
legislation for unconstitutionality. Still, the U.K. Human Rights Act
includes a reading-down provision similar to that in the New Zealand
Bill of Rights, requiring courts to interpret legislation consistently with
the protected rights whenever possible.94 It specifically requires judges to
issue “declarations of incompatibility when they conclude that another

the legislature was a prerequisite of meaningful constitutionalism. See William J.
Brennan, Jr., The Worldwide Influence of the United States Constitution as a Charter of
Human Rights, 15 NOVA L. REV. 1 (1991).
90. The New Zealand Court of Appeal set the tone for the New Zealand Bill of
Rights early on by reading-in a remedies provision to cover executive action in breach of
rights and establishing a public law cause of action for its breach (similar to a Bivens
action, but much wider in scope). See Simpson v. Attorney-General (Baigent’s Case),
[1994] 3 N.Z.L.R. 667; see also RISHWORTH ET AL., supra note 11, at 814-31 (discussing
Baigent’s Case).
91. See, e.g., Ministry of Transp. v. Noort, [1992] 3 N.Z.L.R. 260 (C.A.), available
at 1992 NZLR LEXIS 657 (reading a right to counsel into legislation authorizing
roadside breath testing).
92. Allan, supra note 85; McLean, supra note 56.
93. See Moonen v. Film & Literature Bd. of Review, [2000] 2 N.Z.L.R. 9 (C.A.); see
also RISHWORTH ET AL., supra note 11, at 833-37. Subsequently, legislation was passed
establishing a procedure for obtaining declarations, but only in regard to claims of
discrimination in breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights. See id. at 836.
94. Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42, § 3 (U.K.).
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statute is inconsistent with the enumerated rights but is sufficiently
clearly worded that it must be upheld.”95
Too little time has passed since the U.K.’s Human Rights Act has
come into force to do more than signal how the reading-down provision
might come to be used. Consider, however, the recent case of Ghaidan
v. Mendoza.96 In that case, the House of Lords held that the requirement
to read-down legislation in order to avoid inconsistency with the Human
Rights Act enables a court to depart from the unambiguous meaning that
a piece of legislation would otherwise bear. Lord Nicholls of
Birkenhead made the claim in these words:
It is now generally accepted that the application of section 3 does not depend
upon the presence of ambiguity in the legislation being interpreted. Even if,
construed according to the ordinary principles of interpretation, the meaning of
the legislation admits of no doubt, section 3 may none the less require the
legislation to be given a different meaning. . . .
. . . Section 3 may require the court to . . . depart from the intention of the
Parliament which enacted the legislation. . . .
....
. . . It is also apt to require a court to read in words which change the meaning
of the enacted legislation, so as to make it Convention-compliant [meaning bill
of rights compliant].97

Lord Steyn agreed that the reading-down provision applies even if there is
no ambiguity in the statute. He suggested in clear terms that the
interpretation adopted need not even be a reasonable one,98 and strongly
urged that the English courts opt to use this reading-down provision—more
bluntly, to interpret away any judicially perceived flaws in legislation—as
the primary remedy and to resort to declarations of incompatibility only in
exceptional circumstances. For his part, Lord Rodger adopted a sort of
“judicial vandalism” test, the implication being that anything short of
drastic rewriting of legislation is acceptable.99

95. Id. § 4. The U.K. Human Rights Act also goes further than the New Zealand
Bill of Rights by setting out a process empowering the executive branch of government
to respond to judicial declarations of incompatibility, going so far as to allow the
ordinary legislative process to be dispensed with on a temporary basis. Id. § 10.
96. Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza, [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 2 A.C. 557 (appeal
taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
97. Id. at 571-72.
98. Id. at 574.
99. Id. at 597. However, as Lord Millett notes in dissent, what the majority does
in this case looks to many to amount to judicial vandalism. Id. at 583 (Millet, L.,
dissenting).
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It is crucial to realize that in reaching this result their Lordships
overruled one of their own House of Lords authorities—a case on the
meaning of exactly this same statutory provision, an authority only five
years old, and one that had held the meaning to be clear.100 So the
potential power of these reading-down provisions should not be
underestimated. Even Lord Millett, in dissent, agreed that “even if,
construed in accordance with ordinary principles of construction, the
meaning of the legislation admits of no doubt, [section] 3 may require it
to be given a different meaning.”101 The only constraint he would have
the judges impose on themselves is that the meaning they give the
statutory provision be “intellectually defensible.”102 Yet it is important
to note that he means this not as any very high hurdle to be cleared.
According to Lord Millett, the court “can read in and read down; it can
supply missing words, so long as they are consistent with the
fundamental features of the legislative scheme; it can do considerable
violence to the language and stretch it almost (but not quite) to breaking
point.”103
This goes to show that New Zealand and U.K. judges are in something
of a different position when it comes to rights. Unlike their American
counterparts, they cannot “strike down” legislation for inconsistency
with their bills of rights. Nevertheless, they have considerable room to
read-down legislation, arguably to the point of redrafting statutes the
judges find inconsistent with the indeterminate rights guarantees in their
statutory bill of rights.104 Use of the reading-down power to redraft
statutes is not only hard to distinguish from a power to invalidate or
strike down statutes, as Janet McLean has written, it is also the very
thing that American courts sometimes do, rather than take the larger step
of declaring legislation unconstitutional.105
Be this as it may, both the New Zealand and U.K. bills of rights
include interpretive tools that allow courts to turn ostensibly weak
judicial review into something much stronger where legislation is
concerned. The extent to which judges in those jurisdictions will use
those tools or will prefer a more cautious approach is an empirical

100. See Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Hous. Ass’n, [2001] 1 A.C. 27, 33 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
101. Ghaidan, [2004] 2 A.C. at 585 (Millett, L., dissenting).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Of course, the legislature can respond with a new statute, but that too is then to
be read by the judges as consistent with the enumerated rights, if possible.
105. McLean, supra note 56, at 427-30; see also RISHWORTH ET AL., supra note 11,
at 124-26 (comparing “as applied” invalidity and “reading down”).
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question.106 The important point is that judges in both countries interpret
and apply their bills of rights in the context of parliamentary
sovereignty—any decision they make can be overturned by a simple
legislative majority.
3. Summary
We hope that this brief sketch of how rights-based judicial review
operates in three other common law countries is enough to emphasize
that great care must be taken in relying on what courts in those and
other jurisdictions say about rights, however similarly the respective
rights provisions in their bills of rights may appear to be. Unlike in the
United States, it may be that discussions of rights are but a prelude to a
second-stage discussion focused on considering the extent to which
particular limitations on rights can be justified. Similarly, it may be
that much more of the work of rights-based case law is being done
under the guise of statutory interpretation, and hence that there is less
reticence to appeal to rights-based norms. Nor should one forget that
judicial decisions in these jurisdictions can, in theory if not necessarily
in practice, be overcome by passage of ordinary legislation. For these
reasons and more, there is every reason to be wary of taking the
decisions of foreign courts at face value where rights are concerned.107
106. New Zealand judges breathed life into the New Zealand Bill of Rights under
the leadership of the President of the Court of Appeal, Sir Robin Cooke. Prior to passage
of the Bill of Rights, Cooke had flirted with the idea that judges could invoke common
law authority to refuse to give effect to legislation that infringed fundamental rights. See
Michael Kirby, Lord Cooke and Fundamental Rights, in THE STRUGGLE FOR SIMPLICITY
IN THE LAW: ESSAYS FOR LORD COOKE OF THORNDON 331 (Paul Rishworth ed., 1997)
(discussing and criticizing Cooke’s heretical idea). The Court’s record since Cooke’s
retirement is mixed. See Petra Butler, Human Rights and Parliamentary Sovereignty in
New Zealand, 35 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 341 (2004) (arguing that New Zealand
judges have been careful with their power and generally respected institutional roles).
But see Allan, supra note 85 (providing an opposite argument). It is early days in the
United Kingdom, as we have noted, but the section 3 reading-down provision is proving
to be an important judicial tool.
107. The difficulties involved in understanding the decisions of foreign courts may
be exacerbated under a regional instrument like the ECHR. The European Court of
Human Rights is often required to reconcile competing conceptions of rights from the
various member states. The Court applies a “margin of appreciation,” meaning that it
will often allow a range of interpretations of the protected rights. The difficulty lies in
knowing when the margin of appreciation will apply, and to what extent. See, e.g.,
Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1976 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 506. See generally D.J.
HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 12-15 (1995);
Timothy H. Jones, The Devaluation of Human Rights Under the European Convention,
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C. Non-American Conceptions of Judicial Review
Although Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury in 1803 is
usually taken as the starting point, it took a considerable amount of time
for judicial review to become well established in the United States.108 It
was one thing to assert judicial power to refuse to give effect to laws the
Court considered unconstitutional, but quite another to exercise that
power secure in the knowledge that the other branches of government
would respect the Court’s orders. The heyday of judicial review did not
come until the Warren Court and the civil rights movement in the 1950s,
and viewed in context it was a radical period. Yet, as many have pointed
out, this was the period that countries like Canada took as the defining
period as far as judicial review is concerned.109 Advocates of judicial
review considered that courts had power to do great good in reforming
society, and proposed the adoption of bills of rights with progressive
goals in mind. Brown v. Board of Education110 is the sort of decision
that is supposed to be typical: the U.S. Supreme Court is widely
assumed to have ended racial segregation. Chief Justice Warren showed
what courts could do with a bill of rights, and problems with judicial
review demonstrated by some of the Court’s prior decisions were either
ignored or supposed to have been precluded by the use of different
language to define rights in more modern bills of rights.
It is important to pause here to emphasize the extent to which the
American conception of judicial review differs from that of other
countries with bills of rights. To start, the U.S. Supreme Court’s role is
constitutionally limited; it may pronounce only upon actual cases or
controversies. Secondly, although judicial review is well established in
1995 PUB. L. 430 (U.K.); R. St. J. Macdonald, The Margin of Appreciation, in THE
EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 83 (R. St. J. Macdonald, F.
Matscher & H. Petzold eds., 1993). Different problems arise in the context of
interpreting international bills of rights. To say the least, the decisions of the UNHRC
interpreting the ICCPR are often sparsely reasoned, consisting of little more than
recitations of fact and argument, followed by brief conclusions. See JOSEPH ET AL., supra
note 51, at 50.
108. See Michael W. McConnell, Toward a More Balanced History of the Supreme
Court, in THAT EMINENT TRIBUNAL: JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND THE CONSTITUTION 141
(Christopher Wolfe ed., 2004). Justice Brennan observed that “the federal courts played
only a negligible role in protecting civil liberties until almost a century later, in the
1930s, and most of the progress we have made in America was accomplished within the
last four decades.” William J. Brennan, Jr., Why Have a Bill of Rights?, 9 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 425, 430 (1989).
109. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé of the Supreme Court of Canada has acknowledged
that cases from the 1950s, 60s, 70s, and early 80s—spanning the Warren and Burger
Courts—have been the most influential, among other reasons, because these Courts
“attempted to make the principles of their constitution relevant for modern times.”
L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 15, at 20.
110. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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the United States, its legitimacy is not taken for granted. As a result, a
variety of rules and interpretive techniques have been devised over the
years in an attempt to limit the scope of judicial review, and so respect
the roles of the other branches of government: standing, mootness,
ripeness, the Ashwander doctrine, the political questions doctrine, and so
on.111 To be sure, some of these concepts have foreign analogues, but
they are understood differently in other jurisdictions, and are in general
far less significant. For example, standing requirements tend to be less
onerous in other common law countries, reflecting the concern that
constitutional rights not go underenforced.112 Moreover, foreign courts
are more likely to decide moot cases as a matter of their discretion,
typically on the basis that the Court’s guidance is needed. Judges in
other jurisdictions demonstrate (or sometimes affect) little concern about
the legitimacy of judicial review, certainly far less than their American
counterparts.113
For instance, Canadian judges are fond of denying the need to
legitimate the exercise of their power. In an early case under the
Charter, Reference re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act,114 Justice Lamer of the
Supreme Court of Canada replied to an argument raising concerns about
the legitimacy of judicial review as follows:
This is an argument which was heard countless times prior to the entrenchment
of the Charter but which has in truth, for better or for worse, been settled by the
very coming into force of the Constitution Act, 1982. It ought not to be
forgotten that the historic decision to entrench the Charter in our Constitution
was taken not by the courts but by the elected representatives of the people of
Canada. It was those representatives who extended the scope of constitutional
adjudication and entrusted the courts with this new and onerous responsibility.

111. See generally LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS
POLITICAL PROCESS 85-116 (1988).
112. Standing has been liberalized throughout the English common law world. See
HOGG, supra note 11, § 56.2 (discussing standing in Canada); WILLIAM WADE &
CHRISTOPHER FORSYTHE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 695-700 (9th ed. 2004) (discussing
standing in various common law nations). The concept of a political questions doctrine
has been considered and rejected in Canada. See Operation Dismantle v. The Queen,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 441; cf. LORNE SOSSIN, BOUNDARIES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: THE LAW OF
JUSTICIABILITY IN CANADA 131-200 (1999). The doctrines of ripeness and mootness
exist, but there is no “case or controversy” requirement in other jurisdictions, and courts
are not shy about wading into controversies they consider require judicial resolution.
Obiter dicta is a prominent feature of decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. Id.
113. Something much larger may be going on as well. Judicial willingness to
address constitutional issues may reflect the view that constitutional rights are the
province of the judiciary, rather than the other branches of government.
114. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486.
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Adjudication under the Charter must be approached free of any lingering
doubts as to its legitimacy.115

Other members of the Supreme Court of Canada have emphasized that
they did not ask for the powers the Constitution bestows on them, as
though they are disinterested parties who are simply required to uphold
the Charter (as they interpret it).116
But whether or not they are concerned about justifying the exercise of
their powers, there is no doubt that judges in most common law
countries tend to regard the interpretation of bills of rights as a task to
which the judiciary is uniquely suited, even as they acknowledge the
nonlegal aspects involved in defining rights. In regard to the New
Zealand Bill of Rights, the New Zealand Court of Appeal has asserted as
follows:
Of necessity value judgments will be involved. . . . Ultimately, whether the
limitation in issue can or cannot be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society is a matter of judgment which the Court is obliged to
make on behalf of the society which it serves and after considering all the
issues which may have a bearing on the individual case, whether they be
social, legal, moral, economic, administrative, ethical or otherwise.117

Governments in other countries with bills of rights also tend to
acquiesce to judicial assertions of authority to an extent that Americans
do not. Indeed, they may base important political decisions upon the
judiciary’s heightened role. Some courts, like the Supreme Court of
Canada, have an advisory jurisdiction, allowing the federal government
to ask hypothetical questions of the Court by means of a reference
procedure.118 Many of the most important constitutional law cases in
Canada are in fact decisions on reference questions. In 1998, the
Supreme Court of Canada delivered its decision on whether or not the
province of Quebec could unilaterally separate from Canada, and
whether there was any right to do so as a matter of international law.
The Court answered those questions in the negative, and in the course of
doing so went far beyond the questions asked to deliver an extensive
decision outlining its view on the fundamental postulates of the
115. Id. at 497. Ironically, “fundamental justice,” the term whose meaning was at
issue in this case, was chosen for section 7 of the Canadian Charter in order to avoid the
substantive due process problems of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The
Supreme Court of Canada held that it had a substantive component in any event. B.C.
Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. at 497.
116. See Huscroft, supra note 74.
117. Moonen v. Film & Literature Bd. of Review, [2000] 2 N.Z.L.R. 9, 16-17
(C.A.) (Tipping, J., for the court).
118. Provincial governments can ask reference questions of provincial courts of
appeal, and the decisions on such questions usually end up in the Supreme Court of
Canada on appeal.
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Canadian Constitution—principles the Court inferred from the
Constitution and conferred actionable status upon.119
D. Different Interpretive Theories, Premises, and
Conceptions of Rights
“Living constitutionalism”—the notion that the meaning of
constitutional rights evolves and changes in accordance with the needs
of contemporary society—has been embraced by courts in most common
law countries with bills of rights. Seminal statements include the “living
tree” metaphor announced by the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council (then the highest court in the British Commonwealth) in
Edwards v. Attorney General.120 That case, which long predates
Canada’s adoption of the Charter, established that the Canadian
Constitution is
a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits. . . . Their
Lordships do not conceive it to be the duty of this Board—it is certainly not their
desire—to cut down the provisions of the Act by a narrow and technical
construction, but rather to give it a large and liberal interpretation . . . .121

In Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher, the Privy Council held that bills of
rights should be given “a generous interpretation avoiding what has been
called ‘the austerity of tabulated legalism,’ suitable to give individuals
the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms referred to.” 122
These sorts of statements were embraced by the Supreme Court of
Canada early in the life of the Charter. In Hunter v. Southam, Inc.,
Justice Dickson wrote:
The task of expounding a constitution is crucially different from that of
construing a statute. A statute defines present rights and obligations. It is easily
119. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217; see Richard S. Kay,
The Secession Reference and the Limits of Law, 10 OTAGO L. REV. 327 (2003).
120. [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C. 1929) (appeal taken from Can.).
121. Id. at 136 (Sankey, L.). It is interesting to note the similarity of Lord Sankey’s
remarks to those U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brandeis made in an unpublished draft
dissenting opinion. Several years before Lord Sankey’s remarks, Brandeis wrote: “Our
Constitution is not a strait-jacket. It is a living organism. As such it is capable of
growth—of expansion and of adaptation to new conditions.” BICKEL, supra note 43, at
106-07. Chief Justice Taft requested that he remove those remarks from the opinion:
“[T]hey are certain to be used to support views that I could not subscribe to. Their
importance depends, as old Jack Bunsby used to say, on their application, and I fear that
you and I might differ as to their application.” Id. at 108.
122. [1980] A.C. 319, 328 (P.C. 1979) (appeal taken from Berm.).
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enacted and as easily repealed. A constitution, by contrast, is drafted with an
eye to the future. Its function is to provide a continuing framework for the
legitimate exercise of governmental power and, when joined by a Bill or a
Charter of Rights, for the unremitting protection of individual rights and
liberties. Once enacted, its provisions cannot easily be repealed or amended. It
must, therefore, be capable of growth and development over time to meet new
social, political and historical realities often unimagined by its framers. The
judiciary is the guardian of the constitution and must, in interpreting its
provisions, bear these considerations in mind.123

It is ironic that originalism was so quickly rejected in Canada, given
how much easier it would have been for judges to engage in the sort of
interpretive enterprise that it requires—easier, that is, than with the U.S.
Bill of Rights, which is so much older. Nevertheless, progressive
interpretation of the sort envisaged in Southam is largely uncontroversial
today in Canada.124
Judges from other countries with bills of rights have made similar
statements.125 For example, President Cooke of the New Zealand Court
of Appeal insisted that the New Zealand Bill of Rights there be
interpreted in a way that “keep[s] pace with civilization.”126 Similarly,

123. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 155.
124. Ian Binnie, Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent, CONSTITUTIONALISM
IN THE CHARTER ERA, supra note 8, at 345 (Justice Binnie, of the Supreme Court of Canada,
discussing the Canadian rejection of originalism); cf. Huscroft, supra note 8.
125. The Privy Council, which remains the highest court for a few British
Commonwealth countries, set out the following interpretive approach in Reyes v. The
Queen, [2002] UKPC 11, [2002] 2 A.C. 235 (appeal taken from Belize):
[T]he court must begin its task of constitutional interpretation by carefully
considering the language used in the Constitution. But it does not treat the
language of the Constitution as if it were found in a will or a deed or a
charterparty. A generous and purposive interpretation is to be given to
constitutional provisions protecting human rights. The court has no licence to
read its own predilections and moral values into the Constitution, but it is
required to consider the substance of the fundamental right at issue and ensure
contemporary protection of that right in the light of evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society . . . .
Id. at 246 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
Justice Kirby of the High Court of Australia, where there is not even a bill of rights to
interpret, has urged the use of an interpretive technique that ensures the Constitution is
“constantly evolving.” See Al-Kateb v. Godwin (2004) 219 C.L.R. 562, available at
2004 WL 1747386, at *623. Although Australia has no State or Commonwealth bill of
rights, the judges have sometimes read in “implied rights.” See, e.g., Lange v. Austl.
Broad. Corp. (1997) 145 A.L.R. 96; Theophanous v. Herald Weekly Times Ltd. (1994)
182 C.L.R. 104; Austl. Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1992) 177 C.L.R.
106; Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills (1992) 177 C.L.R. 1; see also Michael Kirby,
Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent: A Form of Ancestor Worship?, 24
MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 1 (2000) (rejecting originalism); Jeffrey Goldsworthy,
Interpreting the Constitution in its Second Century, 24 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 677
(2000) (replying to Kirby’s views).
126. Ministry of Transp. v. Noort, [1992] 3 N.Z.L.R. 260, 271 (C.A.), available at
1992 NZLR LEXIS 657, at *35.
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Justice Barak, President of the Supreme Court of Israel, has endorsed
Justice Dickson’s above remarks from Southam:127
Resort to the ultimate purpose of a constitution allows the constitution to
address life’s changing realities. At the founding of the constitution, its authors
lay a basis for the document that is intended to exercise control over the future.
This control—lest it become mastery—must be flexible enough to allow
development. That is the meaning of the metaphor, “a living constitution.” Its
life is not expressed in imposing old constitutional principles on new
circumstances. The aliveness of a constitution means giving modern content to
old constitutional principles. That is also the meaning behind the metaphor
comparing a constitution to a living tree.128

These sorts of statements presume a controversial understanding of
what it means to have a constitution. For example, Justice Barak
describes a constitution as “sit[ting] at the top of the normative pyramid.
It shapes the character of society and its aspirations . . . . It is at once
philosophy, politics, society, and law.”129 That being so, one might
wonder what it is that makes constitutional interpretation a job for
judges. The larger problem, however, is that these statements all appear
to overlook the role of the elected branch of government in facilitating
change. It is as though bills of rights must cover everything—absolutely
everything—that may arise, through the process of evolutionary
interpretation.130
Progressive interpretation suggests ever-expanding conceptions of
rights, but clearly there must be, and are, limits to the courts’ interpretive
generosity. Judges in progressive interpretation jurisdictions invariably
value things other than rights—things such as ameliorative welfare state
policies—and need to make allowances in order to protect them from
individual rights. Early in the life of the Canadian Charter, Chief Justice
Dickson did just this, holding that although the Charter was to be
interpreted generously and progressively, courts were not to allow
Charter rights to be used to undermine progressive social policies. In R.
127. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145.
128. AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW 390 (Sari Bashi trans.,
2005) (citations omitted).
129. Id. at 370 (citation omitted); cf. Frederick Schauer, Judicial Supremacy and the
Modest Constitution, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1045 (2004).
130. One of us has written at length about the problems with this sort of vision of
judicial review and bills of rights. See Huscroft, supra note 8, at 424-27. The other of us
has made more general arguments against this sort of interpretive approach. See James
Allan, Constitutional Interpretation v. Statutory Interpretation: Understanding the
Attractions of ‘Original Intent’, 6 LEGAL THEORY 109 (2000).
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v. Edwards Books & Art Ltd., he wrote: “In interpreting and applying the
Charter I believe that the courts must be cautious to ensure that it does
not simply become an instrument of better situated individuals to roll
back legislation which has as its object the improvement of the condition
of less advantaged persons.” 131
There is a contradiction here that is not easily reconciled. After all, it
is usually supposed that rights protect individual interests regardless of
the situation of the rights holder. Even assuming that it were
uncontroversial who the “better situated” and the “less advantaged” are,
the notion that rights should have less purchase when they conflict with
socially progressive legislation seriously undermines many rationales
used to justify and defend rights; it also sets the judges up as
unchallengeable determiners of what counts as socially progressive.
Consider the treatment of free speech rights in the United States and
elsewhere. In the United States, robust First Amendment protection results
in the protection of speech many Americans consider to be offensive at best,
and harmful at worst—everything from flag burning to hate speech and
pornography—a degree of protection for speech not seen anywhere else.
The views of theorists like Catherine MacKinnon—considered radical and
rejected in American constitutional law132—are accepted to varying degrees
in many other countries with bills of rights. Indeed, the major free speech
cases come out differently in the United States than in most other common
law countries. Compare American Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut133 with R. v.
Butler134 (a Canadian case upholding criminal law prohibition on possession
of obscene materials); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul135 with R. v. Keegstra136 (a
Canadian case upholding the criminalization of hate speech); New York
Times v. Sullivan137 with Hill v. Church of Scientology (a Canadian case
rejecting the need for reform of defamation law),138 Lange v. Atkinson (a
New Zealand case making modest reform to defamation law),139 and
Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd. (a U.K. case also making modest
reform in the same area).140 Although the Sullivan case has inspired
arguments aimed at limiting the protection afforded politicians and public
131.
132.

[1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, 779.
See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE
RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 40-42 (1997).
133. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
134. [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452.
135. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
136. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
137. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
138. [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130. Note that federal legislation criminalizing defamatory
speech in some circumstances was upheld as a reasonable limit on the freedom of
expression in R. v. Lucas, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439.
139. [2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. 385 (C.A.).
140. [2001] 2 A.C. 127 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
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figures in other countries, invariably courts in those countries conclude that
reputation deserves greater protection than American law provides.141
Numerous additional examples could be given in areas like election
campaign spending,142 openness of trials,143 child pornography,144 and so
on. First Amendment case law, a defining feature of American
constitutional law, is rejected as extreme in many countries with bills of
rights.
The U.S. approach to freedom of speech is not the only thing that has
been rejected. Liberty rights are often given less robust interpretations in
other countries. For example, in Kyllo v. United States the U.S. Supreme
Court held unconstitutional a thermal imaging search under the Fourth
Amendment,145 but in R. v. Tessling the Supreme Court of Canada
unanimously held that thermal imaging did not constitute an unreasonable
search and seizure under the Charter.146 By contrast, when it comes to
equality the highest courts in other countries are likely to provide a far
more expansive interpretation than the U.S. Supreme Court, whose formal
equality approach is usually deprecated. In countries like Canada and
141. The most protection for reputation, and hence the least for freedom of
expression, is provided in Canada. (Australia, without a bill of rights, provides more
protection for freedom of expression.) See Symposium, A Symposium on Defamation
and Political Expression, 2000 N.Z. L. REV. 385 (including articles by John Burrows,
Michael Gillooly, Rosemary Tobin & Geoff McLay). See generally HOGG, supra note
11, § 40.10; IAN LOVELAND, POLITICAL LIBELS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (2000);
Adrienne Stone & George Williams, Freedom of Speech and Defamation: Developments
in the Common Law World, 26 MONASH U. L. REV. 362 (2000).
142. Compare Harper v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 (holding that
third party election spending limits did not unconstitutionally limit freedom of
expression) with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (finding that certain parts of the
Federal Elections Campaign Act violated candidates’ rights to free speech).
143. Compare Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (reversing order
limiting the publication of trial facts because order violated right to free press) with
Gisborne Herald Co. Ltd. v. Solicitor-General, [1995] 3 N.Z.L.R. 563 (C.A.) (holding
that trial considerations outweighed right to freedom of expression). The Canadian
approach is more similar to the American. See Dagenais v. Can. Broad. Corp., [1994] 3
S.C.R. 835 (declaring publication ban on trial facts unconstitutional under Canadian
Charter).
144. Compare R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 (holding restrictions on child
pornography to be constitutional) with Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234
(2002) (declaring ban on virtual child pornography unconstitutional because overbroad
in restricting freedom of speech).
145. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
146. [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432. Ironically, the Court’s unanimous judgment was written
by Justice Binnie, a leading proponent of progressive interpretation. See Ian Binnie,
Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE CHARTER
ERA, supra note 8, at 345.
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South Africa, “substantive equality”—equality of outcome rather than
equality of opportunity and the like treatment of similarly-situated
individuals—is the rule, at least nominally. Equality rights are generally
understood as protecting the disadvantaged, who may be defined having
regard to membership in a particular group on the basis of inherent
characteristics. Limits on the rights of those considered “advantaged”
may not be considered a violation of equality rights at all.147 Where
equality rights are found to be infringed, however, the infringement is less
likely to be held to be justified than limits on liberty rights.
None of this should come as any surprise, given the inherent
contestability of rights and the way in which understandings are shaped
by culture and history. Indeed, concepts like freedom of speech and
equality are embraced by so many because commitment to them requires
so little consensus as to detail. Agreement at the level of moral
abstraction allows widespread disagreement and dissensus down at the
level of drawing difficult social policy lines to be finessed. Hence any
country might cherish these rights and regard them as fundamental, all
the while affording them a different degree of protection. That is just the
nature of rights: they are proclaimed at the level of abstract, indeterminate
generalities to which all, or nearly all, can assent. Yet these same rights
guarantees play out and have real effect down in the Waldronian
quagmire of detail,148 where lines are drawn in highly (and often hotly)
contested and debatable social policy areas in which there is neither
political nor legal consensus as to where those lines should be drawn.
Rights-based constitutionalism is about empowering judges to draw
debatable, contentious lines down in that quagmire of detail on the basis
of largely indeterminate rights that command almost universal approval
and endorsement up in the Olympian heights of moral abstractions. It
should come as no surprise, then, that the American approach to hate
speech differs from the Canadian one, and that people on both sides of
the issue are convinced not only of the rightness of their own positions,
but of their commitment to the protection of rights.

147. See, e.g., President of S. Afr. v. Hugo, 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC) (male parents
denied pardon given female parents); Weatherall v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [1993] 2 S.C.R.
872 (male inmates denied privacy rights from opposite sex guards accorded female
inmates); see also Grant Huscroft, Discrimination, Dignity, and the Limits of Equality, 9
OTAGO L. REV. 697 (2000).
148. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999); Jeremy Waldron, A
Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 18 (1993); see
also James Allan, Bills of Rights and Judicial Power—A Liberal’s Quandary, 16
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 337 (1996); James Allan, Rights, Paternalism, Constitutions
and Judges, in LITIGATING RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 29.
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Accordingly, the constitutionalization of rights proceeds, in our view,
in spite of differences as to where lines must be drawn for particular
rights and, relatedly, in spite of interpretive differences across countries.
III. PART II—TO HAVE DOUBTED ONE’S OWN FIRST PRINCIPLES:149
REVISITING THE DEFENCE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
In this second part we propose to set out the main theoretical
arguments employed to justify the transfer of power to unelected judges
under bills of rights—arguments used to attempt to rebut the
countermajoritarian critique. Our goal here is not to mount a theoretical
attack on (or defence of) any of these rationales, though we may refer
the reader to instances of both on occasion. Rather, our goal is to
enunciate the rationales in a way that makes it clearer whether, or to
what extent, they justify internationalism in interpreting the U.S. Bill of
Rights.
A. The Sirens Argument
The claim here is that bills of rights provide a sort of insurance, by
which people choose—democratically and in advance—to minimize the
possibility that legislation may be passed under the distorting influence of
panic, fear, or anger. Responsibility for the protection of enumerated
rights, approved by the people or by their representatives, is handed over
to an independent, unelected judiciary, in the hope that that branch of
government is more resistant to panic, fear, and anger and so more likely
to keep its head in times of perceived crisis. The usual analogy here is to
Ulysses tying himself to the mast of his ship in order to avoid the
temptation of the Sirens’ beguiling song.150 Knowing our potential for
moral weakness in the future—the possibility of punishing the exercise of
free speech when we disagree with the content of the speech, say, or of
clamping down on religious views with which a majority disagrees—we

149. This subtitle deliberately echoes Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s well known
maxim: “To have doubted one’s own first principles is the mark of a civilized man.”
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Ideals and Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1915).
150. For an analysis of the philosophical merits (or more accurately lack of merits)
of this analogy see Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights,
supra note 148, at 47, and Jeremy Waldron, Freeman’s Defense of Judicial Review, 13
LAW & PHIL. 27, 36-37 (1994).
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entrust certain decisions to others. We “tie ourselves to the mast” so that
the ship of state is not tempted by majoritarian impulse.
As an argument to justify the power of an unelected judiciary the
Sirens Argument is premised on a sort of compact or bargain-type
thinking, albeit a notional one. The judges are acting as the agents or
delegates of the people and of the people’s representatives enforcing
second-order constraints on their first-order preferences, but constraints
the people (or an earlier generation of people) have chosen to place on
themselves. To make the point in more modern terms, it is as though the
people arrived at a cocktail party and handed over their car keys to the
judiciary, instructing them not to return the keys if too much alcohol is
consumed.
In our view, the Sirens rationale is more persuasively available in the
context of domestic rights guarantees than international ones. Whatever
other flaws or strengths this justification for increased judicial power
might have, it requires the people (at some point in time) specifically to
have consented to some set of constitutionalized rights and to have
handed over interpretation and oversight of those rights to their judicial
host.
Where rights-based norms, standards, and line-drawing answers come
from the decisions of foreign courts and international tribunals, it is hard
to see how the American people and their elected representatives can be
said to have consented to the importation of these standards.151 Imagine
that you handed your car keys over to a host in a jurisdiction in which
the blood alcohol upper limit is 0.08 and she decides, on her own
initiative, that an upper limit of, say, 0.03 (in line with that of country X
or Y) is morally preferable. When you turn up at the end of the party
with a blood alcohol reading of 0.04, she refuses to return your keys.
Now, on the merits of what is the best or most sensible approach to
drinking and driving, this host—who draws on international and
comparative norms—may be well be right. But that substantive issue is
irrelevant to defending the host’s power on the basis of the Sirens
Argument. The people agreed to have judges oversee a 0.08 limit,
period. The view of foreign hosts is simply irrelevant.
Notice, too, that this problem of relying on a Sirens Argument rationale
cannot easily be sidestepped by moving from the relative objectivity of
numbers to a more morally overlain concept such as “drunkenness.”
Suppose that your keys are to be returned unless you are drunk. That was
the earlier agreement, the basis on which you gave the host the power to
151. In other jurisdictions, however, it is possible that the people may have given
their consent to the importation of these standards. See supra text accompanying notes
18-20 (discussing New Zealand, South Africa, and the United Kingdom).
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control your keys. The concept of drunkenness, however, is relatively
indeterminate. There is a large penumbra of doubt or uncertainty152 over
what qualifies. There is also an ambiguity. Was the host to enforce the
prevailing standard of drunkenness in the United States at the time of the
party, or was she to enforce some other view—even one from abroad or
inspired by international practice—if she thinks it to be a better view?
The latter option, when tied explicitly to the bargain-type thinking
underlying a Sirens Argument, is only persuasive to the extent one
believes it reflects the deal that was entered into at the time of being tied
to the mast. One needs to be persuaded that this was the intention of
those entering into the bargain. In other words, did those who adopted
the U.S. Bill of Rights seek to have these moral issues determined on the
basis of what were the prevailing standards in other countries? This
seems highly implausible.
A more plausible alternative may be to picture the Ulysses bargain as
allowing the host to enforce her own best moral view of what counts as
drunkenness. This is to take the well-known Dworkinian line that the
moral terms in a bill of rights were intended to be handed over to
unelected judges for them to give their best moral understanding of the
concepts.153 On this view, the adopters knew and intended that the
understanding of these terms would change over time, progressing as
society’s understanding of drunkenness developed and advanced.
For our purposes, however, the point is not whether one finds that sort
of progressive approach to interpretation attractive.154 The point is that
it is not easily connected to the Sirens Argument. It works if, and only
if, you really did instruct the host to apply her own moral standard of
drunkenness, and you were prepared for her standard to be informed or
influenced by foreign standards. Recall, of course, that your decision to
152. This is the metaphor made famous by H.L.A. HART in his THE CONCEPT OF
LAW (1961) (discussing “penumbra of uncertainty,” id. at 131, and “penumbra of doubt,”
id. at 119).
153. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, The Forum of Principle, in A MATTER OF
PRINCIPLE 53-57 (1985); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996); Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 115 (Amy Guttman ed., 1997). For a
full argument on the extent to which Dworkin can be understood as an originalist (in the
above sense), see Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Dworkin as an Originalist, 17 CONST. COMMENT.
49 (2000).
154. Context matters here. It may not be attractive, but it may nevertheless be
legitimate if it were agreed upon in adopting the rights guarantee in the first place. See
Allan, supra note 130.
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hand over the keys to someone else was motivated by the fear of moral
weakness on your own part.
The issue, then, is how far one can stretch the notion of a bargain in
which one seeks to bolster his or her own potential moral weakness.
How far can the notion of asking the host to enforce her own moral
views of drunkenness be stretched before it collapses into an explicit
bargain to enforce foreign moral standards? Clearly there is some room
for stretch here, but perhaps not as much as is sometimes assumed. It
seems plausible to suppose that most people entering into a Ulysses-type
bargain would want either some sort of idea of the standards being
brought to bear (meaning originalism of some sort or other) or some sort
of idea of whose views would count. They will not fear their own moral
weakness more than they fear the moral weakness of every other person
or group. There will be limits to their willingness to have others’ views
preferred to their own. They may well be content to hand the decision
over to this host, or to American judges in the future. Equally, however,
they may well balk at foreign or international moral standards being
determinative, or even relevant, even if such standards only become
determinative because this host or this U.S. judge thinks them to be good
standards. At that point the Sirens rationale has been stretched
dangerously thin.
It bears repeating, nonetheless, that this is not to say that such an
approach to interpretation is not a good one; it is simply to say that,
when it is tied explicitly to the bargain-type thinking of the Sirens
rationale, the connection becomes somewhat tenuous.
It follows that American judges who appeal to international and
comparative rights-based case law for authority to override the will of
the American people are likely to require some further justification
beyond a Sirens-type argument.155
B. The Constitutional Argument
The assertion here, not unrelated to the Sirens Argument, is that written
constitutions, and so any standard bill of rights they contain, are a way to
lock in and make difficult to alter particular outcomes—outcomes that
155. The Sirens example may pose different sorts of problems depending upon the
nature of the rights guarantee in question. It should not be supposed that the
international community will always adopt more progressive or more generous
interpretations that have the effect of broadening the scope of a right. Indeed it may be
that the international community is less sympathetic to some rights than others. Property
rights, for example, may well be subject to narrower interpretations outside the United
States, and reliance on international authority in this regard would have the effect of
limiting rights rather than broadening them. In these circumstances, the judges
themselves may be vulnerable to the Sirens’ song the people sought to avoid.
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appear to be just and appropriate at the time the constitution is drafted. As
Justice Scalia has put it:
It certainly cannot be said that a constitution naturally suggests changeability; to
the contrary, its whole purpose is to prevent change—to embed certain rights in
such a manner that future generations cannot readily take them away. A society
that adopts a bill of rights is skeptical that “evolving standards of decency”
always “mark progress,” and that societies always “mature” as opposed to
rot.156

Put differently, constitutions are a better bet than what Larry Alexander
has described as “the vicissitudes of democratic politics.”157 “We may
believe that we have the best rules we can ever have, and that there is far
more danger of loss of political wisdom and morality or of political
akrasia than there is danger that wide agreement on better rules will be
thwarted.”158 In other words, we opt for a constitution and a bill of
rights because we prefer to risk “rigidity rather than risking security.”159
Our concern here is with the relevance of foreign and international
case law. This argument makes it even plainer that the underlying
justification for allowing the unelected judiciary to void acts of the
legislature is not applicable to decisions founded on the decisions of
foreign courts or international tribunals. It would be odd, to say the
least, to distrust future American politicians while being sanguine about
future developments in the courts of other countries, or international
tribunals (none of which existed, of course, when the U.S. Bill of Rights
was ratified). If concern about the vicissitudes of democratic politics
and the likelihood of mistaken change by American voters explains the
decision to lock in a set of rights, then calling in aid a foreign elite to, in
effect, update and alter that set of rights through interpretive processes is
156. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, supra note 153, at 3, 40-41.
157. Larry Alexander, Introduction to CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS 1, 8 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998).
158. Id. at 2. Justice Jackson famously referred to the purpose of withdrawing
certain subjects from the “vicissitudes of political controversy” in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943):
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied
by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not
be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.
159. Alexander, supra note 157, at 4.
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bizarre. Constitutionalism designed to preserve, rather than facilitate
growth or change, is about making things hard to change for everyone; it
is not about giving an elite body of foreign judges or experts a place in
the debate about how rights should play out in the United States.
Thus, this second argument, which we have called the Constitutional
Argument, also seems applicable only to domestic rights guarantees.
That said, it gives rise to an interpretation dilemma that must be
considered. The dilemma is this: if the Constitutional Argument is
going to work on its own terms—assuming, in other words, that a
distrust of future politics is on balance warranted160—then the judges
have to be prepared to give effect to what appear to be the original
intentions of the enactors, or the original understandings of the protected
rights. They must, as Justice Scalia has put it, treat the U.S. Bill of
Rights as confirmatory rather than amendatory.161
It is observable, however, that they do not. The apparent triumph of
the “living constitution” means that the Constitutional Argument rests on
questionable empirical foundations even as regards domestic rights
guarantees. The more a bill of rights is thought of as a changing,
evolving document, one that needs to keep pace with changing social
values (and even with civilized developments elsewhere), the more room
judges will have to appeal to and incorporate into American law
developments from other jurisdictions and international law, but also the
less they will be able to appeal to the Constitutional Argument to justify
those actions. (Here we refer to those provisions amenable to expansive
interpretation, provisions like the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses.)
Accordingly, the way in which a domestic bill of rights is interpreted
by a country’s judges may well gut the Constitutional Argument on
160. One of us has argued explicitly that it is not warranted. See JAMES ALLAN,
SYMPATHY AND ANTIPATHY: ESSAYS LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL (2002); Allan, supra
note 61, at 192-94.
161. See Antonin Scalia, The Bill of Rights: Confirmation of Extant Freedoms or
Invitation to Judicial Creation?, in LITIGATING RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 19, 22.
There need not be a strict dichotomy between confirmatory and amendatory bills of
rights. Modern bills of rights may be both confirmatory in some respects and
amendatory in others, although it is noteworthy that bills of rights are often sold on the
basis that they are in fact confirmatory, the idea being that they would not change all
that much. The New Zealand Bill of Rights is a good example here. Among other
things, the White Paper, supra note 18, asserted that, even in entrenched, supreme law
form, “for the most part it would not control the substance of the law and of the policy
which would continue to be elaborated in, and administered by, present and future
parliaments and governments.” Id. § 4.14. The White Paper is discussed in Grant
Huscroft, Rights, Bills of Rights, and the Roles of Courts and Legislatures, in
LITIGATING RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 3, 5-8. On the other hand, the South African
Bill of Rights is obviously more amendatory than confirmatory in nature, in view of
the apartheid regime it replaced.
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purely empirical grounds, namely that at the point of application judges
do not in fact pay much regard to the original intentions or
understandings of the rights that were chosen to be locked in. Rather,
they adapt them to what they, the judges, see as changing social values
and conditions. The more this is an accurate description of what is
happening, the less one can justify any sort of judicial power in terms of
preferring the potential dangers of rigidity over the potential dangers of
wise majoritarian actions being stymied today. “Living constitution”
interpretive techniques do not threaten rigidity, at least not for the
judges. They threaten illegitimate or insufficiently restrained judicial
power—kritarchy—but certainly not rigidity. Only the people and their
elected representatives are locked in under this interpretive approach.162
The decisions of foreign courts and international tribunals are more
likely to be relevant where a bill of rights is seen as a living, evolving
instrument and progressive interpretation is favored. Without more,
however, such an interpretive approach does not justify the decision to
empower an unelected judiciary to override the will of the people and
their elected representatives. Something more is required, and in the
case of reliance on rights-based internationalism that something more
does not seem to flow from the Constitutional Argument, and only very
weakly from the Sirens Argument.
Hence, we have still to find a solid rationale applicable to
internationalism in American courts.

162. Given progressive interpretation, it follows that the efforts of those who would
carefully draft a new bill of rights or an amendment with the idea of correcting a
perceived “mistake” or inadequacy—perhaps one revealed by the decision of a foreign
court under a provision in another country’s bill of rights—are largely misguided or
misplaced. Putting aside any Waldron-style concerns about the legitimacy of such an
enterprise, attempts to prescribe or preclude certain interpretive outcomes are likely to
fail in a constitutional system in which progressive interpretation is orthodox. For
instance, Canada’s Charter excluded the term “due process” in order to avoid the U.S.
Supreme Court’s “substantive due process” case law, only to be stymied a few years
after passage of the Charter by the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision that the
alternative term chosen, “principles of fundamental justice,” had substantive as well as
procedural content. See Reference re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486.
New Zealand avoided the use of the term “equality,” preferring the term
“discrimination,” in order to minimize interference with social policy, only to find that
the ostensibly more simple prohibition on discrimination had the same effect. See
RISHWORTH ET AL., supra note 11, at 366-97.

43

ALLAN-HUSCROFT.DOC

4/20/2006 8:27 AM

C. The “Yes There are Objectively Right Answers” Argument
Under this heading falls all professions to the effect that disputes
about rights have mind-independent right answers (the first leg of
claim), and that unelected judges are in a better position to find those
right answers than are elected legislators (the second leg of claim). This
argument comes in a variety of guises ranging from simple intuitionism,
to calling in aid “right reason,”163 to the sophisticated, elaborate Dworkinian
version with its reference to a fictional judge Hercules164 and extensively
worked out concept of integrity.165
Notice that this argument can succeed only if the first and second legs
both succeed themselves. Even assuming that mind-independent right
answers to moral questions (and so, to disputes about the rights in a bill
of rights) exist, there is no reason to entrust such disputes to judges
unless they seem better placed “to discover” or “to find” such answers.
Conversely, and perhaps more obviously, the case for antimajoritarian
decisionmaking processes appears to diminish if mind-independent
moral answers and answers about the coverage and ranking of bill of
rights’ rights do not in fact exist.166
Jeremy Waldron points out that the first leg actually subsumes two
separate issues, a metaphysical or ontological question and an
epistemological question. Even if we assume that mind-independent
right answers to moral and rights disputes exist, it does not follow that
human beings have any way of knowing what those right answers are.167
Indeed, Waldron goes on to argue that in a world of widespread moral
disagreements and dissensus there is in fact no way to know—nothing
remotely comparable to finding and testing right answers in the
empirical, material, scientific world where regularities of like effect
following like cause are imposed from without on human minds—what
these assumed to exist moral right answers might be. If Waldron be
persuasive, that too erodes the case for antimajoritarian decisionmaking
processes.
163. See, e.g., T.R.S. ALLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE: A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE
RULE OF LAW 2 (2001).
164. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105 (1977).
165. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 176-275 (1986).
166. Dworkin has latterly come to the conclusion that his legal theories require him
explicitly to defend this position. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth:
You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87, 89 (1996). One of us has argued that
Dworkin’s argument there signally fails. See James Allan, Truth’s Empire—A Reply to
Ronald Dworkin’s ‘Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It’, 26 AUSTL. J. LEGAL
P HIL . 61 (2001), reprinted in S YMPATHY AND A NTIPATHY : E SSAYS L EGAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL, supra note 160, ch. 3.
167. See Jeremy Waldron, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity, in NATURAL LAW
THEORY 158, 173-75 (Robert P. George ed., 1992).
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The Right Answer Argument depends, therefore, on strong judicial
review under a bill of rights being understood as a substantive exercise,
not as itself a procedural or voting or head-counting exercise.168 Yet here
at last we have a rationale that is potentially applicable when the decisions
of foreign courts and international tribunals are relied on by domestic
judges to overrule the elected branches. If there be a mind-independently
right answer to what the ambit and scope of, say, the freedom of speech
under the First Amendment should be and how it should apply, and if the
judges know (or are most likely to know) what this answer is, then all of
us committed to rights should welcome the enunciation and imposition of
that answer by the judges. More to the point, we should welcome this
answer even if American courts, in finding it, need to consider the
decisions of foreign courts or international tribunals. The source of the
rights matters far less than the ‘rightness’ of their application.
If found convincing, this “Yes There Are Objectively Right Answers”
Argument would clearly justify and support the transfer of power to
judges under the U.S. Bill of Rights. In addition, it would also lend
support to the use of the decisions of foreign courts and international
tribunals.
D. The “Judicial Process is Superior to the Political
Process” Argument
Legal academics are, in general, unabashedly elitist in preferring
judicial resolution to political resolution. A cynic would say that this is
because judges have proven more likely than legislators to deliver the
sort of first-order judgments on rights questions they prefer—though that
answer is given less often in the United States these days.169 Few
outside the United States suppose that this situation will not continue.
For many, however, the preference for judicial review reflects
disrespect, if not disdain, for the democratic process. Legal academics

168. See Waldron, Freeman’s Defense of Judicial Review, supra note 150, at 29-32
(arguing that such judicial review is at core purely procedural—that is, the
decisionmaking rule is simply that the most judicial votes wins, whatever the substantive
merits of competing judgments).
169. And hence may possibly explain the enthusiasm of some for interpretation
outside the Court. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
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are less likely to see the value in the democratic process than political
theorists or philosophers.
Robert Nagel has written much in this vein. As he notes, the operation
of the democratic process invariably involves compromises that fail to
satisfy the protagonists completely. They are likely to appear incoherent
or unprincipled compared with what appear to be principled resolutions
in a court of law, replete with lengthy statements of reasons (that,
outside of the constitutional law community, are almost sure to go
unread).170
It is not surprising that democratic processes are thought by some to
fare badly when compared to the judicial processes. After all, judges
have numerous advantages over politicians. For example, they are not
subject to anything remotely like the scrutiny and criticism politicians
endure from the public and the press on a daily basis.171 Indeed, given
the power they exercise judges lead a privileged existence: they are
beholden to no one, and are virtually secure for life in their
appointments.172
We do not mean to suggest that there is anything inappropriate about
the independence of the judiciary. The point is that a variety of
considerations make it difficult to fairly assess the claim that judicial
resolution is inherently superior to political resolution as a matter of
process. There is little doubt, however, that the judicial process is more
attractive to most lawyers and legal academics than the political process,
where lawyers have no special expertise as far as getting elected is
concerned and only modest advantages in understanding and utilizing
legislative machinery. More to the point, in the legislative process
lawyers cannot insist that issues are resolved on their terms, pursuant to
the sorts of processes with which they are familiar.

170. ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND
CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 119 (1989) (“Compared to the detached, careful
evaluation of briefs and evidence in light of an explicit, consistent set of legal values that
is the ideal of the judicial process, the legislative process is a nightmare of irrational
decision making.”).
171. Judges in most other common law countries are not subject to scrutiny prior to
their appointment. Nor is their performance once in office subject to invasive scrutiny.
Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong’s THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
(1979), an exposé of the workings of the U.S. Supreme Court, has no counterpart, and
judicial biographies are rare—and often hagiographic rather than critical in any event.
See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHARPE & KENT ROACH, BRIAN DICKSON: A JUDGE’S JOURNEY
(2003); Rande Kostal, Book Review, Shilling for Judges: Brian Dickson and His
Biographers, 51 MCGILL L.J. (forthcoming 2006).
172. Unlike in the United States, where Supreme Court justices serve for life, the
highest appeal court judges in most other common law countries serve during “good
behaviour” until fixed retirement ages that vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. It is
almost unheard of for a judge to be removed from office.
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This point is even more forceful outside the United States. Americans
regard the court as a political institution no less than the other branches
of government, and understand its work in political terms; Canadians,
New Zealanders, the English, and others are more likely to see the
courts’ resolution of rights questions in legal rather than political terms.
Relatedly, American academics often suppose that the judiciary in these
countries must be apolitical, or at least less political than the American
federal courts.173
Even assuming an apolitical bench in any comparable country,
however, this in itself would not go very far in justifying rights-based
internationalism. For this fourth argument to justify internationalism it
is not enough to believe that the judicial process is superior to the
legislative one in the United States; one also needs to believe that
foreign or international judicial or quasi-judicial processes are superior
to the American legislative process. Whatever the latter’s faults may be
thought to be, that is unlikely to be a widely held belief.
This fourth argument seems largely inapplicable to international and
foreign rights-based law.
E. The “Judges Achieve Better Outcomes” Argument
The assertion here is a straightforward empirical, and indeed utilitarian
one, not unrelated to the Right Answer Argument outlined above. It is
that judges achieve better outcomes than elected legislators. That alleged
fact, according to this argument, justifies rights-based constitutionalism.
Indeed, the assertion is often a point of pride, especially for judges.
Speaking on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the passage of
the Canadian Charter of Rights, Justice Iacobucci of the Supreme Court
of Canada asked rhetorically whether Canadians were better off as a
173. This is a mistake, in our view, and may be a considerable one at that. The
Executive in most common law countries enjoys considerably greater power than
American presidents when it comes to appointing judges to the highest courts. In
Canada, for example, judges are appointed to the highest courts in all of the provinces as
well as to the Supreme Court of Canada by members of the governing party (the Prime
Minister and Minister of Justice) without confirmation hearings or approval procedures.
One political party, the Liberal Party, has been in office for the better part of a
generation—all but about nine of the last forty-two years—and as a result has appointed
the vast preponderance of superior court judges sitting in Canada. It is not surprising to
find that there is a relative homogeneity of outlook as a result—certainly, there is no
right-left dichotomy on any Canadian appellate court—but this should not be confused
with an apolitical outlook.
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result of passage of the Charter.174 He supposed, as only a judge could,
that politics would have stood still had the Court not effected change
through its Charter decisions, ignoring the long history of progressive
legislative change prior to passage of the Charter.
Putting this problem aside, consider the ways in which judges and
judicial review might achieve better outcomes than the legislative
branch. It is worth remarking that the claimed better consequences—the
utilitarian benefits of affording the judiciary the last word when it comes
to various enunciated rights—might be achieved in terms of the welfare
of certain minority groups or it might result in terms of rights
themselves. Hence, the claim might be that particular groups (say,
African Americans, gays and lesbians, or women) do better—have their
positions more widely or deeply or intensely improved—under
unelected judges than elected legislators. Alternatively, the claim might
be the more encompassing one that rights themselves, or rights-based
outcomes, are better protected and more fully realized across the whole
population where judges are given a powerful say under the U.S. Bill of
Rights.
Now obviously this claim is difficult to verify no matter how it is
couched, since on either account it involves not simply identifying the
good that may occur—assuming there is agreement on what constitutes a
good outcome—but weighing it up with the bad. As Jeremy Waldron
has observed, that bad includes more than simply the loss to the
democratic process.175 Cases such as Dred Scott v. Sandford,176 Plessy v.
Ferguson,177 and Lochner v. New York178 spring to mind on the negative
side of the ledger.
In any event, on this sort of argument the source of the rights being
better protected by the unelected judges does not matter all that much; it
is the good consequences that matter. Therefore this argument, should
one find it persuasive, also provides at least some support to a judiciary
prepared to rely on rights-based internationalism to gainsay the decisions
of American legislators.

174. Frank Iacobucci, The Charter: Twenty Years Later, 19 SUP. CT. L. REV. 2D 381
(2003) (Can.).
175. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Eisgruber’s House of Lords, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 89,
93 (2002); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE
L.J. (forthcoming 2006).
176. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
177. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
178. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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F. The Dialogue Argument
The argument here is that rights-based constitutionalism gives rise to a
dialogue of sorts between the elected branch of government and the
unelected judiciary. On this account, judicial decisions can usually be
understood as leaving room for a legislative response that allows a
legislative purpose to be achieved, albeit by different means. Of course,
where the particular bill of rights is a statutory one, as in the United
Kingdom or New Zealand—where judges do not have the power to
strike down or otherwise refuse to apply legislation they consider
inconsistent with rights—the dialogue metaphor seems plausible.
Obversely, where the bill of rights is entrenched with no explicit means
for the legislature to overrule the judiciary, as it is in the United States,
the dialogue metaphor appears less plausible.
Be that as it may, there are overtones here of a separation or balance
of power type argument.179 In addition to any purported long-term
benefits from diffusing power (including partly to the judiciary), the
Dialogue Argument also contains a set of assumptions, some of which
seem almost Whiggish in the central role they afford to rationality and
the possibility of better decisionmaking after consultation and debate.
Hence, a dialogue between the judges and the legislature (over the
specific content to give to vague, amorphous rights guarantees, over the
relative ranking and scope of those rights, and over how they should
relate to other social policy concerns) will lead to better decisions.
Justice Brennan described the role of an “active judiciary” as
the calmer, cooler party to a dialogue from which the community benefits over
time. . . . To the extent that reason and reflection have any role to play in moral
judgment and constitutional adjudication—and I believe that their role is
considerable—the dialogue in which the courts and the legislature engage is a
salutary one.180

Such a dialogue, according to this argument, leads both parties to think
again, to compromise, and to reach outcomes together they could not
have done apart or independently.
The Dialogue Argument seems to take for granted that the metaphor
of a “dialogue” is an accurate description of what takes place between
judiciary and legislature under a bill of rights regime. In fact, the
relations and interactions between unelected judges and elected
179.
180.

See infra Part III.G.
Brennan, supra note 108, at 433-34.
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legislators may look almost nothing like a dialogue.181 Indeed, attempts
at dialogue are sometimes met with great hostility from the Court, along
with an assertion of judicial superiority in interpreting the Constitution,
as the fate of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act demonstrates.182
Nevertheless, this Dialogue Argument does give some, albeit rather
slight, support to the practice of referring to international jurisprudence
on rights questions. If we are talking about a process in which the
quality of decisionmaking increases together with the level and amount
of consultation and debate, then presumably the more input the better.
Of course, the dialogue here would expand beyond the elected branches
of government and the unelected domestic judiciary to include new
participants, namely the foreign judges and international officials who
have pronounced on rights-based claims. These new participants would
not be given a full or guaranteed say; their influence would depend on
whether the domestic judges wished to listen to their views on particular
rights issues. Having made that qualification, it is worth noting that the
same qualification is true of the Dialogue Argument in the domestic
context. American judges may listen to American legislators and alter
and shape their understanding of rights in the light of the views of the
elected branches. Then again, they may not; nothing requires that they
do so. It all depends on whether the unelected judges are inclined to
listen, as opposed to “covering their ears, and chanting the mantra: ‘It is
emphatically the province of the judiciary to say what the law is.’”183
Nevertheless, if found convincing this rationale provides some support
for rights-based internationalism.
G. The Balance of Power Argument
If it be true that power corrupts, then dividing up that power and
establishing countervailing checks and balances may seem a wise idea in
many circumstances. On this view, bicameralism, with a genuine house
of review, seems desirable. Perhaps also federalism. Why not go the
whole hog and give significant power (under the aegis of operating a bill
of rights) to unelected judges? The claim here, then, is that a bill of
rights sets up another branch of government that has significant—but not

181. Jeremy Waldron, Some Models of Dialogue, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE
CHARTER ERA, supra note 8, at 7.
182. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000), was beyond
congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment).
183. Jeremy Waldron, Some Models of Dialogue, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE
CHARTER ERA, supra note 8, at 7.
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too great—powers. Clearly this sort of thinking is at least somewhat
reflected in the judgment of the Framers of the American Constitution.
This rationale, however, cannot easily be stretched to encompass the
decisions of foreign courts and international tribunals. In one sense, of
course, power can be diffused anywhere. Yet it is unlikely that a
majority of Americans would consent (nor did they in fact actually
consent) to establishing an explicit balancing and checking role for
judges of foreign courts or members of international tribunals, even if
that role be only at the discretion of American judges hearing particular
cases.
This argument seems to us plausibly applicable only in regard to
domestic rights guarantees.
H. The Tyranny of the Majority Argument
The spectre of the potential “tyranny of the majority” is often raised as
justification for the transfer of power from the elected branch of
government to the judiciary. Leave aside the fact that any convincing
weighing up of relative dangers needs to balance the potential threat of
majority rule and the spectre of a tyranny of the majority against the
potential threat of minority rule and the spectre of a tyranny of the
unelected few. The Tyranny of the Majority Argument seems to
function simply by claiming that majoritarianism—letting the numbers
count—comes with too big a price tag; it is too likely to lead to the
sacrifice of individual rights. Majority rule needs to be tempered by
placing in the hands of the judiciary the power to ensure that legislation
(passed on the basis of representative majoritarianism) can be struck
down when it is considered by judges to be inconsistent with certain
enumerated individual rights and that inconsistency is not (again,
thought by the judges to be) reasonable or defensible.
The Tyranny of the Majority Argument is a recurring theme in
constitutionalism, not only in the United States. Here is an example
from the extrajudicial writings of Chief Justice McLachlin of the
Supreme Court of Canada:
[I]t is wrong to suggest, as some do, that anything that limits what the elected
majority might wish to do—including judges—is anti-democratic. This notion
that Parliamentary democracy resides only in majority rule is both false and
dangerous. It is false because, as we have seen, the power of elected officers is
necessarily limited by the law in a constitutional democracy. And it is
dangerous. It offers no protection against the tyranny of the majority and it
overlooks the need to accommodate and validate minoritarian views essential to
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long-term democratic stability. . . . In a pluralistic constitutional democracy,
majorities are not permitted to impose their moral values, their conception of
the good life, at the expense of those who do not control political life. Each
Canadian is a member of a minority, in one sense or another. Each of us can
see, from that perspective, that democratic rule is not the same as majority
rule.184

Notice the subtle, yet important, suggestion by Chief Justice McLachlin
that the judiciary is the only branch of government interested in protecting
rights. This deprecation of the elected branch of government resonates
with the public in many countries; the people are only too willing to think
the worst of politicians, and to presume that legislators are prone to
excesses. As Jeremy Waldron has observed, however, criticism of
democratic majoritarianism overlooks the obvious point that the Court is
itself a majoritarian institution. The same hotly contested issues that
legislators address are faced by judges, and like legislators judges decide
cases by voting on their outcome. A five-four decision of the United
States Supreme Court is as effective as a nine-zero decision in striking
down legislation that might have been passed by a unanimous legislature.
Be that as it may, the Tyranny of the Majority Argument is in some
ways similar to the preceding Balance of Power Argument. The
difference is this: If you fear majoritarianism and seek to temper it, then
rights-based norms, standards, and line-drawing answers from foreign
courts and international tribunals may be seen as yet another useful
constraint.
This argument provides some support for rights-based internationalism.
I. The “Bills of Rights Change Nothing” Argument
This is the home of the cynic. For the cynic, judges operating under the
U.S. Bill of Rights always have an eye on popular opinion, on what would
have been the result of democratic decisionmaking. True, the judges can
get slightly ahead of, or fall slightly behind, the public mood. But they are
unlikely to do so for very long.185 Some cynics therefore see no benefit in
bills of rights, with the powerful judiciaries they establish. Others seem to
see them as roughly equivalent to Roman circuses, a pleasant diversion for
many and so worth having for that reason, if not for any other.
This argument seems to work only for domestic rights guarantees. To
the extent that it justifies the kind of transfer of power to the judiciary
that comes with a bill of rights, it fails to do so for rights-based
184. Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada, Judging, Politics, and Why
They Must be Kept Separate, Address Before the Canadian Club of Toronto 2 (June 17,
2003), available at http://www.canadianclub.org/speeches/speech_2926.pdf.
185. See Mark Tushnet, Scepticism about Judicial Review: A Perspective from the
United States, in SCEPTICAL ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 359, 365.
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internationalism. American judges may have an eye on popular opinion
in the United States, but it is much less credible—in fact downright
implausible—to assert that foreign rights-based decisionmakers are
concerned with American public opinion and will not get too far ahead
of, or fall behind, it. Indeed, their views may differ greatly, which is
precisely why some want to import their decisions.
J. Summary
We have outlined the main sorts of arguments commonly used to
justify the adoption of a bill of rights and the resulting rights-based
constitutionalism that follows in its wake. Four of these arguments—the
Constitutional, Superiority of the Judicial Process, Balance of Power,
and Cynic’s Arguments—provide no or virtually no support for the use
of the decisions of foreign courts or international tribunals in American
courts. In other words, even if you are inclined to think that these
arguments are available rationales in the context of domestic rights
guarantees, they will not help justify appeals to rights-based
internationalism.
On the other hand, five of the above arguments—namely, the Sirens,
Objectively Right Answers, Judges Achieve Better Outcomes, Dialogue,
and Tyranny of the Majority Arguments—potentially work to varying
extents in justifying the use of the decisions of foreign courts and
international tribunals. In other words, if (and only if) you find these
arguments persuasive justifications in the context of domestic rights
guarantees, you will also have grounds to find them so for international
and comparative law rights guarantees.
In our view, however, none of these latter five arguments—alone or in
tandem, and even taking account of the interpretation dilemma—suffices
to justify the use of foreign and international authority in interpreting the
U.S. Bill of Rights. This is the more so if it is accepted that rights-based
internationalism produces a ratcheting-up effect—that the incentives lie
far more on the side of increasing the range of situations to which
indeterminate, amorphous rights guarantees apply, at the expense of
democratic law making powers.
Making a brief case for the likelihood of that ratcheting-up effect is
the object of the third part of this article.
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IV. PART III—THE RATCHETING-UP EFFECT OF FOREIGN
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
We began in Part I by arguing that the rights-based jurisprudence of
other common law countries and international tribunals rests on
distinctly non-American premises and understandings of rights, quite
apart from clear differences in the various sorts of bills of rights.
Approaches to the interpretation of rights differ along with judges’
perceptions of their role, to say nothing of the background democratic
institutions and checks and balances. In the second part, we set out the
sorts of justifications typically employed in attempts to rebut the
countermajoritarian difficulty, the seeming illegitimacy of unelected
judges drawing too many of society’s social policy lines—lines that
must be drawn when abstract, amorphous rights guarantees have to be
applied to everything from abortion to euthanasia, hate speech, and
religious freedom. We also indicated which of those justifications we
thought were potentially applicable when it is foreign and international
rights-based law and norms that are being used to justify the exercise of
judicial power, noting that there are fewer such plausible justifications
once it is the views of foreign judges and international experts that are
being relied upon to gainsay American legislators.
Our main thesis, as noted at the start of this paper, is simply that
Americans should be more wary than most when it comes to the
decisions of foreign courts and international tribunals. As we have
noted, unlike some who have adopted bills of rights, Americans have
never agreed that the decisions of foreign courts are or should be
relevant; they have not empowered their courts to engage in rights-based
internationalism for domestic purposes. Nor have they instructed or
authorized their judges to engage in the sort of global dialogue that
many jurists suppose to be their duty.186 It is incumbent on proponents
of rights-based internationalism to make the case for it. In our view the
similarities between the U.S. Bill of Rights and other bills of rights are
insufficient to overcome the considerable differences between American
and other forms of constitutionalism. The arguments just outlined and
elaborated in detail in Parts I and II, above, form the first two branches
of our case for that conclusion.
The third and final ground we give for being wary of foreign rights-based
constitutionalism is the tendency it has to produce a ratcheting-up effect,
one where judges in each jurisdiction are tempted to draw on the most
186. See, e.g., L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 15, at 40 (“No longer is it appropriate
to speak of the impact or influence of certain courts on other countries, but rather of the
place of all courts in the global dialogue on human rights and other common legal
questions.”).
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expansive interpretations of judges from other jurisdictions, while almost
never being tempted to rely on their more restrictive interpretations. Justice
Scalia’s critique of this practice is short and to the point: “To invoke alien
law when it agrees with one’s own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not
reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry.”187
Consider the New Zealand experience we outlined above, where the
judges took an enervated, statutory bill of rights—a parliamentary bill of
rights, according to its sponsor—and in fewer than a dozen years
conferred quasi-constitutional status upon it, interpreting it in a manner
more suited to what they thought it should say. They emphasized the
reading-down provision; established a power to issue declarations of
inconsistency; and created a cause of action for breach of rights.188
Much of this was accomplished by pointing to the decisions of foreign
courts and international tribunals, and arguing that what bills of rights
required elsewhere—even bills of rights that were wholly unlike New
Zealand’s because entrenched and constitutionalized—should also be
required in New Zealand. Baigent’s Case189 is perhaps the most obvious
and egregious example of this tactic of pointing to broader, more
expansive practices abroad to ratchet-up the practice at home. In
Baigent’s Case the New Zealand Court of Appeal (then New Zealand’s
highest domestic court) drew support from judicial decisions from
Canada, Ireland, India, the West Indies and more, as well as from
decisions of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC)
under the ICCPR, in order to create a public law cause of action for
breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights, and did so despite the
deliberate decision of the New Zealand Parliament to omit a remedies
provision.190
Not all of the New Zealand decisions have been so expansive as regards
rights, but even the more conservative decisions of New Zealand courts
make an important point. For instance, the New Zealand Court of Appeal
rejected the argument that legislation allowing only opposite-sex marriage
was inconsistent with the prohibition on discrimination on the ground of

187. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 627 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
188. See Allan, supra note 85.
189. Baigent’s Case, [1994] 3 N.Z.L.R. 667.
190. Id.; see James Allan, Speaking with the Tongues of Angels, [1994] 1 N.Z. BILL
RTS. BULL. 2; J.A. Smillie, The Allure of ‘Rights Talk’: Baigent’s Case in the Court of
Appeal, 8 OTAGO L. REV. 188 (1994).
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sexual orientation in Quilter v. Attorney General.191 The plaintiffs in that
case then complained to the UNHRC but the Committee held that the
ICCPR did not provide a right to same-sex marriage.192 Yet it is
noteworthy that neither of these decisions features in the recent Canadian
decisions holding that the opposite-sex requirement in the law of marriage
violated the Charter. This is precisely the sort of picking-and-choosing
that can be expected with internationalism. In a world of sometimes
widely-differing decisions and no settled comparative law methodology,
the normative preferences of the judges hearing particular cases are likely
to determine whether or not a particular foreign or international precedent
makes its way into a judicial decision.
The direction of movement seems to us to be virtually all one way,
towards recognizing more and more instances in which rights guarantees
apply—and hence, less and less room for democratic decisionmaking. It
is rare to find examples of domestic judges pointing to foreign cases or
the decisions of international tribunals in support of decisions to limit or
rein in the range or reach of rights.
The issue of prisoner voting entitlements reinforces this last point.
Numerous countries including the United States, the United Kingdom,
Australia, and New Zealand place some sort of restrictions on whether
and when prisoners can exercise the franchise.193 The same was true in
Canada, before two decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada.194 In the
second of those two decisions the Chief Justice of Canada, writing for a
five Justice majority, dismissed out of hand the approach taken in other
countries:
I conclude that denying penitentiary inmates the right to vote is more likely to
send messages that undermine respect for the law and democracy than
messages that enhance those values. The government’s novel political theory
that would permit elected representatives to disenfranchise a segment of the
population finds no place in a democracy built upon principles of
inclusiveness, equality, and citizen participation. That not all self-proclaimed

191. [1998] 1 N.Z.L.R. 523 (C.A.); see RISHWORTH ET AL., supra note 11, at 377-80
(discussing Quilter).
192. Joslin v. New Zealand, Commc’n No. 902/1999, U.N. GAOR Human Rights Comm.,
75th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 214, U.N. DOC. A/57/40 (Vol. II) (2002), available at http://documentsdds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/668/60/img/N0266860.pdf?OpenElement.
193. Many United States jurisdictions restrict or completely deny voting rights to
prisoners. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 2 (no right to vote in prison or on parole);
COLO. CONST. art. 7, § 10 (no right to vote while in prison).
194. In Sauvé v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 438, the Supreme Court of
Canada struck down a blanket ban on prisoner voting. Later, in Sauvé II, [2002] 3
S.C.R. 519, in a five-four decision the Supreme Court of Canada struck down a
legislative compromise taking away the franchise only from those convicted of more
serious offences.
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democracies adhere to this conclusion says little about what the Canadian
vision of democracy embodied in the Charter permits.195

Certainly there was no suggestion that the understandings of rights in
these other countries lent any support at all to the Canadian Parliament’s
decision to limit the right to vote.
“[T]he persuasive force of international law,”196 as Justice Kirby of the
High Court of Australia calls it, is near to being a one-way street.
Reliance on it does and will carry with it a ratcheting-up effect; it will
almost never be used to pare back the scope and ambit of situations that
rights guarantees are held to protect. That, in our view, is a third reason
why Americans should be wary about making use of the rights-based
decisions of international bodies and foreign courts.
V. CONCLUSION
The idea of constitutionally entrenched rights originated in the United
States and it has spread widely in the latter half of the twentieth century.
There is increasing pressure on American judges to heed the human
rights jurisprudence of foreign courts and international tribunals when
interpreting the U.S. Bill of Rights. It is widely assumed that the
influence of rights-based internationalism is wholly benign and a force
for good.

195. Sauvé II, [2002] 3 S.C.R. at 548 (emphasis added). The gratuitous reference to
“self-proclaimed democracies” presumably includes the United States, New Zealand,
and Australia, all of which are referred to in Justice Gonthier’s dissenting opinion. Id. at
588, 591 (Gonthier, J., dissenting).
196. Al-Kateb v. Godwin (2004) 219 C.L.R. 562, available at 2004 WL 1747386,
at *629. Justice Kirby has written and spoken at length about the internationalization of
rights-based law, claiming that the “willingness of national constitutional courts to look
outside their own domestic legal traditions to the elaboration of international, regional
and other bodies represents a paradigm shift that has happened in municipal law in recent
years.” Id. at *627 (citing Canada, Germany, India, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom, in addition to the United States). To his dismay, his approach has not yet been
adopted in Australia. Id. at *622. However, he asserts confidently: “[W]ith every
respect to those of a contrary view, opinions that seek to cut off contemporary Australian
law (including constitutional law) from the persuasive force of international law are
doomed to fail.” Id. at *629. Kirby suggests that they will be viewed as notorious
precedents like Dred Scott, “with a mixture of curiosity and embarrassment.” Id.; see also
Justice Michael Kirby, International Law—The Impact on National Constitutions, Lecture
at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 29, 2005)
(expanding on his views), available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/kirbygrotius050401.pdf.
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We have argued that this assumption, however widespread, is a
dubious one. Americans have more reasons than others to be especially
wary about rights-based internationalism.
The reason for this is not (or not largely) because American
constitutional law is becoming ever less relevant in other countries with
bills of rights—though we think that is the case. Nor is it because (or
largely because) top foreign common law judges face nothing like the
scrutiny of top U.S. judges when appointed, while international law
“experts” win their posts via an even more opaque, political trade-off
reliant process—though that too is true.
Instead, the three main reasons we have given for counseling wariness
on the part of Americans when it comes to rights-based internationalism
are these: First, quite apart from differences in bills of rights and
understandings of rights across various countries and internationally, the
very basics of American constitutionalism—the conception of the state
and its role, the relevance of institutional checks and balances, and so
on—are not shared internationally, and sometimes differ greatly. These
differences combine to create a comparison of apples and oranges.
When the U.S. Supreme Court considers a decision from a top common
law court or international tribunal about how an abstract, indeterminately
phrased right should apply to a concrete and specific issue, it is nothing
like the situation when it considers its own precedents.
Our second reason for wariness is that bill of rights adjudication
takes place against the backdrop of the countermajoritarian difficulty.
It is one thing—and perhaps in itself a difficult thing—to justify the
power handed to domestic judges to interpret a domestic bill of rights
adopted after debate and disagreement and some sort of head
counting exercise some time in the nation’s past. It is a significantly
different thing—and we have argued in Part II above a much more
fraught and dubious thing—to try to justify giving a role to the
decisions of foreign courts and international tribunals to gainsay
elected American legislators. In fact, we have argued that no
justifications, alone or together, exist to justify American judges
making use of comparative and international rights-based law to
trump the American democratic process.
The third and last main reason for wariness is the likelihood, the
strong likelihood, of a ratcheting-up effect accompanying any shift to
greater reliance on foreign precedents. We think the former will
certainly attend the latter, and cause an overall diminution of the
scope for democratic decisionmaking in the United States.
Comparative constitutional law is a worthwhile exercise in a
variety of contexts, most obviously in the drafting of constitutions.
Indeed it is a necessary exercise in interpreting bills of rights in some
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countries. However, it has less of a place in interpreting the U.S. Bill
of Rights than its proponents have established. America’s top judges
should think twice before constitutional rights come home to roost.
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